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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE MARKET VALUE IMPLICATIONS OF PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION 
by  
Diane Elizabeth Hendrix Turner 
Florida International University, 2013 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Clark M. Wheatley, Major Professor 
Pension funds have been part of the private sector since the 1850’s. Defined Benefit 
pension plans [DB], where a company promises to make regular contributions to 
investment accounts held for participating employees in order to pay a promised lifelong 
annuity, are significant capital markets participants, amounting to 2.3 trillion dollars in 
2010 (Federal Reserve Board, 2013). In 2006, Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No.158 (SFAS 158), Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and 
Other Postemployment Plans, shifted information concerning funding status and pension 
asset/liability composition from disclosure in the footnotes to recognition in the financial 
statements. I add to the literature by being the first to examine the effect of recent pension 
reform during the financial crisis of 2008-09.  
This dissertation is comprised of three related essays. In my first essay, I investigate 
whether investors assign different pricing multiples to the various classes of pension 
assets when valuing firms. The pricing multiples on all classes of assets are significantly 
different from each other, but only investments in bonds and equities were value-relevant 
during the recent financial crisis. Consistent with investors viewing pension liabilities as 
liabilities of the firm, the pricing multiples on pension liabilities are significantly larger 
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than those on non-pension liabilities. The only pension costs significantly associated with 
firm value are actual rate of return and interest expense.  
In my second essay, I investigate the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows, 
extending the Barth et al. (2001a) model of the accrual process. Using market value of 
equity as a proxy for cash flows, the results of this study suggest that aggregate 
accounting amounts mask how the components of earnings affect investors’ ability to 
predict future cash flows. Disaggregating pension earnings components and accruals 
results in an increase in predictive power. During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, 
however, investors placed a greater (and negative) weight on the incremental information 
contained in the individual components of accruals. The inferences are robust to 
alternative specifications of accruals.  
Finally, in my third essay I investigate how investors view under-funded plans. On 
average, investors: view deficits arising from under-funded plans as belonging to the 
firm; reward firms with fully or over-funded pension plans; and encourage those funds 
with unfunded pension plans to become funded. Investors also encourage conservative 
pension asset allocations to mitigate firm risk, and smaller firms are perceived as being 
better able to handle the risk associated with underfunded plans. During the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 underfunded status had a lower negative association with market 
value.  
In all three models, there are significant differences in pre- and post- SFAS 158 
periods. These results are robust to various scenarios of the timing of the financial crisis 
and an alternative measure of funding. 
  
 
 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER          PAGE 
I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON PENSIONS .............................................................................................. 9 
 
III. PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION 
Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development ............................................................. 12 
Sample and Research Design ........................................................................................ 18 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 19 
Additional Tests ............................................................................................................ 24 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 28 
 
IV. ACCRUALS AND THE PREDICTION OF FUTURE CASH FLOWS 
Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development ............................................................. 29 
   Sample and Research Design…………………………………………………………..38 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 42 
Additional Tests ............................................................................................................ 46 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 51 
 
V. FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION PLANS IN THE U.S 
Prior Literature and Hypotheses Development ............................................................. 52 
Sample and Research Design ........................................................................................ 59 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 64 
Additional Tests ............................................................................................................ 67 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 71 
 
VI. DISCUSSION ............................................................................................................. 72 
 
ACCOMPANYING TABLES .......................................................................................... 76 
 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 115 
 
APPENDIX A: ESTIMATION OF DEFRET AND ATRANS………………………..120 
VITA……………… ....................................................................................................... 122 
 
  
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE          PAGE 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for 2003-2011, variables in per-share     76 
Form 
 
Table 2  Percentages of Classes of Pension Assets      77 
 
Table 3 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in  
per-share form  (N=7316)          78 
 
Table 4  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in  
per-share form  (N=7316) to determine effect of various  
Financial Crisis periods on Asset classifications       80 
 
Table 5  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in  
per-share form  (N=6093) to determine effect of various  
Financial Crisis periods on Asset classifications; Firms  
with positive earnings only        82 
 
Table 6  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in  
per-share form  (N = 2272 for 2003-2005 and N = 5044  
for 2006-2011)           83 
 
Table 7  Descriptive statistics (scaled by total assets); 2004-2011 
N=6056          86 
 
Table 8  Mean Percentage of plan assets invested in various  
classes of Assets (2004-2011)       87 
 
Table 9  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by 
 total assets (N=6056)           89 
 
Table 10  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by  
Total Assets to determine the effect of SFAS 158  
(N = 1271 for 2004-2005 and N = 3937 for 2007-2011)    92 
 
Table 11  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by  
total assets (N=6056)          95 
 
Table 12  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by  
Total Assets to determine the effect of SFAS 158  
(N = 1271 for 2004-2005 and N = 3937 for 2007-2011)     97 
 
 
 
ix 
 
Table 13  Percentages of Classes of Pension Assets    100 
 
Table 14 Descriptive statistics for 2003-2011, variables in  
per-share form, 1170 firms N = 6832 (Number of  
underfunded firms = 6,226; Number of fully or  
overfunded firms = 606)       101 
 
Table 15  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in  
per-share form N = 6000 (Number of underfunded  
firms = 4,777; Number of fully or overfunded  
firms = 1223)         103 
 
Table 16  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011,  
variables in per-share form N = 6832 (Number  
of underfunded firms = 6,226; Number of fully  
or overfunded firms = 606)        105 
 
Table 17  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables  
in per-share form to determine the effect of SFAS 158  
(N = 6000: N = 1878 for 2003-2005 with 1481  
underfunded and 397 fully or overfunded; N = 4122  
for 2006-2011 with 3296 underfunded and 826 fully  
or overfunded        107 
 
Table 18 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in  
per-share form  to determine the effect of SFAS 158  
(N = 6832 N = 2156 for 2003-2005 with 1995  
underfunded and 161 fully or overfunded; N = 4676 for  
2006-2011 with 4231 underfunded and 445 fully or  
overfunded        110 
 
Table 19  Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in  
per-share form N = 6000 (Number of underfunded  
firms = 4,777; Number of fully or overfunded  
firms = 1223)        112 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pension funds have been part of the private sector since the 1850’s. Defined Benefit 
pension plans [DB], where a company promises to make regular contributions to 
investment accounts held for participating employees in order to pay a promised lifelong 
annuity, are significant capital markets participants. Investments by such plans amounted, 
for example, to 2.3 trillion dollars in 2010 (Federal Reserve Board, 2013). Given the 
magnitude of pension assets held in reserve, it is important to understand the effect of 
pension accounting standard-setting. With the recognition of actuarial gains and losses in 
comprehensive income, rates of return on pension assets have an economically significant 
impact on the book value of equity. 1 
In 1984, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87), Employers’ 
Accounting for Pensions required, among other things, that four components of pension 
cost be disclosed: accrual of interest (INT) for the year on the projected pension benefit 
obligation (PBO); service cost - the present value of expected future pension payments 
attributed to employee services performed during the year (SVC); the actual rate of return 
on plan assets including realized and unrealized gains and losses, return on assets, and 
estimated return on assets including a deferred portion (RPLNA); and the net deferral and 
amortization of the effects of past transactions (TAMOR). In 2003, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No.132R (SFAS 132R,)  Employers’ Disclosures about 
Pensions and Other Postretirement Plans, further enhanced pension disclosures by 
requiring firms to disclose the amounts invested in 4 major categories of plan assets: 
                                                 
1 For an example of the magnitude of this impact, on average, amounts equal to 61% of net income for the 
firms in this sample are provided by returns on pension assets. 
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bonds2; equity securities; real estate; and other assets. Other assets are the amounts not 
invested in equities, bonds or real estate and include hedge fund assets. In 2006, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.158 (SFAS 158), Employers’ 
Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postemployment Plans, went one step 
farther, shifting information concerning pension asset/liability composition from 
disclosure in the footnotes to recognition in the financial statements.  
Prior studies have also found differences in how investors view recognized as 
opposed to disclosed information (see for example: Davis-Friday et al., 1999, Hirst, 2004, 
and Schipper, 2007). In these studies, I look at whether recognizing pension information 
(as opposed to disclosing it) altered its association with market values.3 As Schipper 
(2007, p. 304) notes: “First, because recognition is subject to special criteria, and because 
SFAC No. 5 states that disclosure and recognition are not substitutes, it is evident that 
disclosure and recognition are not financial reporting alternatives—they are not intended 
to serve the same purpose.” As previously noted, SFAS 158 requires pension information 
to be recognized in the financial statements. This added volatility to the financial 
statements through the inclusion of actuarial gains and losses in comprehensive income. 
Speaking to the impact of SFAS 158, Skaife et al., (2007) state that “SFAS 158 will lead 
to financial statements that better reflect the underlying economics of the plans…[SFAS 
158] will eliminate the need to provide reconciliations in the notes to the financial 
statements that many users may not see or understand” (p. 202). It appears that FASB 
                                                 
2 The amount invested in fixed income securities, cash and short-term securities, U.S. government and 
government agency securities, corporate bonds and notes, and mortgages. 
3 The passage of SFAS 87, SFAS 132R, and SFAS 158 suggests that the FASB believes disclosure, and 
later recognition, adds incremental value to the financial statements. 
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believes recognized information is more relevant to users of financial statements than 
disclosed information. Why else would FASB have issued SFAS 158 requiring the 
recognition of information disclosed under SFAS 132R? In their comment letter to the 
FSAB, PricewaterhouseCoopers states. “We believe that recognizing these off-balance 
sheet amounts, which collectively are estimated at billions of dollars, represents a 
significant improvement in financial reporting….financial statements will be more 
complete and transparent by fully recognizing these amounts rather than continuing to 
relegate them to the financial statement footnotes, which can be difficult to understand.” 
Many studies have verified the differences in investor responses to recognition versus 
disclosure. Kimbrough (2007) studies financial statement recognition and analyst 
coverage and finds them to be associated with firm value. Davis-Friday, et al., (1999), for 
example, study whether financial statement data is valued differently by financial markets 
if it is disclosed in the footnotes rather than recognized in the body of the financial 
statements. Using several valuations tests, they find that information that is recognized 
receives more weight than that which is disclosed. The format with which information is 
presented also impacts the weights non-professional investors place on that information 
(Maines and MacDonald, 2000). Specifically, they find that information on the volatility 
of unrealized gains is only taken into consideration by non-professionals when that 
information is formally presented in a statement of comprehensive income. Lehavy et al., 
(2011) analyze the complexity and readability of 10-K filings and find that “less readable 
10-Ks are associated with greater dispersion, lower accuracy, and greater overall 
uncertainty in analyst earnings forecasts” (p. 1087), while Hodder, et al. (2008) find that 
something as simple as the structure of the indirect method of presenting operating cash 
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flows can impede users’ information processing. I examine the economic effects of SFAS 
158 in terms of the actions taken by firms to compensate for the effects of pension 
accounting reform in terms of changes in investment percentage of the 4 classes of 
pension assets and how the stock market responds to perceived changes in risk (increases 
in volatility introduced by recognition). I add to the literature by examining how 
accounting presentation has affected pension asset allocation, accruals and the funded 
status of pension plans. There are significant differences in the pre- and post- SFAS 158 
periods. 
Accounting information and regulations do not, however, exist in a vacuum, and my 
sample period includes a global liquidity crisis. In the first quarter of 2007, the FDIC’s 
Quarterly Banking Profile reported that FDIC-insured institutions experienced the largest 
year-over-year decline in quarterly earnings since the first quarter of 2001. At the same 
time, the increase in loss provisions was the largest in five years 
(http://www2.fdic.gov/qbp/2007mar/qbp.pdf). According to the World Economic Report: 
Crisis and Recovery issued in April 2009 by the International Monetary Fund 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf),  
In the year following the outbreak of the U.S. subprime crisis in August 2007, the 
global economy bent but did not buckle…. The situation deteriorated rapidly after the 
dramatic blowout of the financial crisis in September 2008, following the default by a 
large U.S. investment bank (Lehman Brothers), the rescue of the largest U.S. 
insurance company (American International Group, AIG)…. The global economy is 
in a severe recession inflicted by a massive financial crisis and acute loss of 
confidence.…Total expected write-downs on global exposures are estimated at about 
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$4 trillion, of which two-thirds will fall on banks and the remainder on insurance 
companies, pension funds, hedge funds, and other intermediaries.  
 
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the recession began in 
December 2007 and ended in June 2009. While the economy has not returned to pre- 
recession levels, June of 2009 marks the beginning of an economic expansion 
(http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html). I control for the financial crisis of 2008-
2009 at both the firm and economy-wide levels and find that the financial crisis had an 
impact on pension asset allocation, accruals, and the funded status of pension plans. 
My doctoral dissertation consists of three essays that examine the effects of pensions 
on the market value of equity. These essays examine pension reforms, controlling for the 
financial crisis of 2008-09, as they examine the value markets place on pension asset 
allocation, accruals and disaggregated pension earnings, and the funded status of pension 
plans. 
My first dissertation essay examines whether market participants assign different 
pricing multiples to the various classes of assets and, if so, how this affects their use of 
the components of pension costs. Toward that end, I also explore the classic accounting 
question: which is more important to market participants, balance sheet information or 
income statement information? I also examine the existence of synergies between them, 
i.e., which is more value-relevant, information that is recognized or disclosed?  
I find that the pricing multiples on the pension cost components: actual rate of return 
on plan assets (RPLNA) and interest (INT) are significantly different from each other and 
are the only plan costs with pricing multiples that are significantly associated with market 
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values. This suggests that the other pension cost components are viewed as containing 
stale information (Barth et al., 1993).   
Second, I find that the pricing multiples on pension asset/cost components are 
significantly different from each other. The significant differences in the pricing 
multiples of pension cost components and pension asset components suggests that 
investors respond to the relative riskiness of long-horizon pension assets and liabilities 
(Barth et al. 1993). 
Next, I find that pension liabilities have larger pricing multiples than firm liabilities. 
This effect disappears, however, when pension costs and assets are disaggregated into 
their components. At the same time, pension assets have significantly lower pricing 
multiples than non-pension assets. The significantly larger pricing multiples on pension 
liabilities suggests that investors view pension liabilities as belonging to the firm while 
pension assets (with their significantly lower pricing multiples) are not viewed as 
belonging to the firm. This latter finding is consistent with the constraints placed on U.S. 
firms when they attempt to withdraw a pension surplus (Weidman and Weir, 2004, find a 
similar result for Canadian firms).  
The fact that the significantly larger pricing multiple on plan liabilities disappears 
when more detail is provided regarding the composition of plan assets and costs suggests 
(consistent with Barth et al., 1993) that the incremental explanatory value of pension 
liabilities and costs are redundant once details on pension balance sheet variables are 
included.  
In my second essay, I investigate the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows, 
extending the Barth et al. (2001a) model of the accrual process, in the context of pension 
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accounting reform and the financial crisis of 2008-2009. I extend that research by 
examining the effect of disaggregating pension information into the major components of 
assets and costs. Consistent with prior literature concerning the effects of disaggregating 
(Barth et al., 2001a and Nam et al., 2012), I find that not only do the major components 
of accruals enhance predictive power but also that the major components of pension 
assets and liabilities enhance the predictive power of future cash flows. Further, investors 
attach different pricing multiples to the various components. 
Barth et al., (2001a), extending the analysis of Dechow et al. (1998), was the first to 
examine how the components of earnings affect the ability to predict future cash flows 
(referred to below as the BCN model). They found that each accrual component 
significantly enhanced the ability to predict cash flows. They reasoned that since accruals 
contain information about delayed cash flows and future cash flows, the securities 
markets would assign different pricing models to the individual components of accruals. 
Nam et al. (2012), using a cross-sectional model, concludes that “Although the ability of 
accruals to contribute to the predictions of finite measures of cash flows varies with 
model specifications and levels of aggregations of the dependent variable, it is robust and 
unequivocally significant when the market value of equity is predicted” (p. 172). I extend 
this literature by including the effect of pension asset cost components, using both the 
BCN balance sheet model and the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). I find, 
using both models, that pension assets and cost components, together with accrual 
components, enhance the ability to forecast future cash flows (proxied by the future 
market value of equity).  
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In addition, I find evidence that managers signal discretionary information to the 
markets during the financial crisis, and as a result, investors placed a greater weight on 
the incremental information contained in the individual components of accruals. There is 
a change in the sign and an increase in the magnitude of the effect of the accrual 
components for all accrual components except depreciation/amortization. I conclude that 
the reason the  sign of depreciation and amortization does not change during the financial 
crisis may be due the inability of managers to signal using a cost that is tied to long-term 
rates of return on capital assets. I also discover a flight of capital from equities and real 
estate during the financial crisis (Bernanke et al., 1996; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 
2005, 2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008 and Gelos and Wei, 2005). 
In my third essay, I explore the association between the market value of equity and 
pension funding status. Funding status may have a substantial economic impact on cash 
flows. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security ACT (ERISA) of 1974, firms 
with private employer-sponsored DB plans funded from 80 to 90 percent of pension 
obligations, may have to accelerate cash contributions to the plan. Accelerated cash 
contributions are unconditionally required if the funding rate is below 80 percent 
(Coronado and Sharpe, 2003). The U.S. Pension Protection Act (2006) requires full 
funding status within 7 years (Amir et al., 2010). Therefore, pension funding, and the 
required cash to bring plans to funded status, may have a large impact on the value 
shareholders place on the sponsoring firm’s equity. I find that investors reward firms that 
have fully funded pension plans with higher market values as compared to firms with 
underfunded plans. I also find that the capital markets perceive larger firms to have 
higher levels of risk with respect to pension liabilities, i.e., underfunded pension plans are 
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more negatively associated with market values for larger firms as compared to smaller 
firms. 
I find there are significant differences between pre- and post SFAS 158 periods. The 
increased differentiation between pension asset, liabilities and earnings by investors 
caused by accounting presentation means valuation errors may have decreased as 
evidenced by smaller pricing multiples on pension components coupled with smaller 
standard errors in the post-SFAS 158 period. 
I organize the following dissertation by presenting background of pension accounting 
regulations in Chapter II and each of these three essays in Chapters III, IV, and V, 
respectively.  I conclude with a discussion of the overall results and contributions of my 
dissertation in Chapter VI. 
 
II. BACKGROUND ON PENSIONS 
While pensions have been part of the fabric of U.S. business since the 1850’s, at first, 
accounting standard setters were reluctant to formalize accounting for pensions. The 
reasons for this reluctance varied. One of the reasons that accrual-based pension 
accounting standards were not developed was that such standards were not seen as 
necessary. Rather than compensation, pensions were seen as a gratuity, a reward for loyal 
service (Glaum, 2009; Napier, 2009; Klumpes, 2001). As a result, pension accounting 
consisted of recognizing the cash paid in a given period. The practice of expensing 
pension costs when disbursed continued into recent years in countries such as Germany, 
where firms did not recognize a future liability for pension benefits (Ippolito, 1985).   
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The gratuity theory came under attack in the U.S. at the beginning of the 20th century 
when Henry Hatfield (1916) suggested employers should include “the amount necessary 
to provide for future pensions” in operating expenses. Despite a shift in attitudes that led 
to pensions being viewed as a form of deferred compensation (Ippolito, 1985), 
accounting regulators felt that since the pension calculations were highly complex, and 
that pension accounting should fall within the domain of actuaries (Napier 2009).  
In response to wage and price controls during WWII, markets began to give credence 
to the view that pensions are an element of employee compensation, i.e., that present 
wages are given up in exchange for wages in retirement (pensions). As a result, in the 
post WWII period, two conflicting perspectives: the finance perspective and the labor 
economics perspective were developed. Both of these perspectives are based on the need 
to actuarially fund past service obligations in addition to the current policy of periodic 
expense measurement. They differ, however, in ownership and accounting recognition 
for pension assets and liabilities. We still see evidence of the schism between these two 
schools of thought and the compromises reached in current pension accounting 
regulations. 
The finance perspective assumes that pension surpluses/deficits belong to 
shareholders while the labor economics perspective views pension surpluses/deficits as 
belonging to employees (Klumpes (2001). According to the finance perspective, the 
corporate financial structure of pensions is relevant in the market’s evaluation of the 
sponsoring firm. The finance perspective implies that the net worth of the pension fund 
(assets, current liabilities, and funded status) should be recognized on the sponsor’s 
balance sheet. Actuarial gains/ losses and costs (such as service costs, interest costs, etc.) 
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should likewise be reported on the income statement. The labor economics perspective 
implies that the pension fund is separate from the sponsor and therefore, should not be 
shown on the balance sheet except in the case of a deficit. SFAS 87, “Employers' 
Accounting for Pensions” (1985), the first pension accounting regulation by the FASB, 
represents a compromise between these two perspectives (Klumpes 2001). 
As pensions began to be seen more as a form of deferred compensation, there was a 
call for accrual based accounting for pensions (Ippolito 1985; Blake, Khorasanee, 
Pickles, and Tyrall, 2008). The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
passed in 1974 by the U.S. Congress is meant to ensure that employer-sponsored pension 
plans are financially secure.  In response to ERISA, FASB issued a Discussion 
Memorandum: Employer’s Accounting for Pensions and Other Postemployment Benefits, 
in 1981, from which the accounting standard SFAS No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for 
Pensions (FASB 1985) was born. 
As I note above, SFAS No. 87 represents a compromise between the corporate 
finance perspective and the labor economics perspective. It passed by the narrow margin 
of 4-3 (Napier 2009), and requires both the recognition of benefits accrued as of a date 
(without considering future pay increases: ABO) as well as the projected benefit 
obligation [PBO] which considers future pay increases if the pension formula is based on 
compensation levels. SFAS No. 87, however, clouds the value of a defined PBO by 
allowing a corridor approach. Under the corridor approach, firms are allowed to delay 
the recognition of gains and losses as long as they do not exceed 10% of the larger of: (a) 
the defined benefit obligation (DBO); or (b) the fair value of the plan assets. Under SFAS 
87, information about funded status, fair value of plan assets, expected earnings rates, and 
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DBO are disclosed in the footnotes, not recognized in the body of the financial statements 
(Blake et. al 2008; Glaum 2009; Napier 2009).  
SFAS 132R, Employers’ Disclosures About Pensions and Other Postretirement 
Benefits (FASB 2003), enhances the disclosures concerning pension plans by requiring 
firms to disclose “the percentages of each major category of plan assets” without 
changing recognition or measurement rules (Chuk 2011). SFAS 158, Employers’ 
Accounting for Defined Benefits Pension and Other Postemployment Plans (FASB 2006), 
goes further than previous regulations by shifting disclosures about funded status (the 
difference between PBO and the fair value of fund assets) from the footnotes to the 
balance sheet while still allowing for the corridor method in the income statement. 
Actuarial gains/losses are now recognized in other comprehensive income [OCI]. Thus, 
current pension accounting introduces volatility to both the balance sheet and income 
statement, but also provides more information about pension assets, liabilities, costs and 
earnings.  
 
III. PENSION ASSET ALLOCATION 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESE DEVELOPMENT 
Pension funds are important to capital markets. Given the magnitude of pension 
assets held in reserve, it is important to understand the effect of pension accounting 
standard-setting. Prior research has found that disaggregated costs can be more 
informative to investors than aggregate costs (Barth et al., 1992; Amir, 1996, Barth et al., 
2001). Prior studies have also found differences in how investors view recognized as 
opposed to disclosed information (see for example: Davis-Friday et al., 1999, Hirst, 2004, 
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and Schipper, 2007). In this study I look at not only the information content of 
disaggregated pension assets, but also at whether recognizing pension information (as 
opposed to disclosing it) altered its association with market values. 
Early pension accounting research centers on the question of whether or not investors 
can cope with the complexity of estimations of actuarial gains/losses over long 
horizons—i.e. is pension information useful to investors?  As posited by Barth, et al., 
(2001), value relevance studies, including ones concerning pension information, strive to 
be informative about the effects of accounting amounts on market value, not to tell 
standard-setters what standards should be. The early pension research is centered on two 
approaches, a balance sheet approach and an income statement approach. It was not until 
1995, when Ohlson proposed the clean surplus model in which firm value is explained as 
the book value of equity and residual income that pension research took into 
consideration both balance sheet and income statement measures simultaneously. 
Daley (1984) uses a cross-sectional equity model based on income statement 
amounts. He regresses the equity value of the firm on after-tax earnings before pension 
costs and after-tax pension costs. 
MVEit = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 PCit + ε      (1) 
where EbPC are after-tax earnings before pension costs and PC are after-tax pension 
costs. His results suggest that pension expense is the “most consistent” cost measure, and 
reported period pension expense may be impounded into equity prices. 
Continuing with the income approach, Barth, et al., (1992) explore the value-
relevance of the components of pension costs and pension liabilities as required by SFAS 
87. They use an expanded version of equation (1) which includes pension costs 
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decomposed into the various components required by SFAS 87. Their model takes the 
following form: 
MVE = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 INTit + β3 SVCit + β4 RPLNAit + β5 DEFRETit  
+ β5 ATRANSit + ε       (2) 
where INT is interest cost, SVC is service cost, RPLNA is expected return on plan assets, 
DEFRET is the deferred return on plan assets, ATRANS is the amortization of the 
transition asset and EbPC is defined as above. They find that investors assign different 
price multiples to the pension cost components (although they find the pricing multiple 
on ATRANS is not significantly different from zero). The pricing multiples on pension 
income streams are generally larger than the price multiples of non-pension income 
streams. They argue that this supports the idea that investors view pension income as less 
risky than other income.  
Landsman (1986) was the first to use the balance sheet approach in assessing the 
information content of pension accounting. Based on the accounting equation that equity 
is equal to assets minus liabilities, he divides the assets and liabilities into pension and 
non-pension components. The basic form of his equation is: 
MVE = α + β1 NPAit + β2 NPLit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + ε     (4) 
where NPA is non-pension assets, NPL is non-pension liabilities, PLA is plan assets and 
PL is plan liabilities. He finds significant pricing multiples on pension assets and 
liabilities, and concludes that the securities markets value disclosed pension assets and 
liabilities similarly to recognized assets and liabilities. 
Based on the idea that accounting standards prevent the book value of equity from 
equaling the market value of equity (non-recognition of intangible assets such as those 
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which are internally-generated and the incorporation of historical values which mask 
current market values), Ohlson (1995) shows that the uncaptured book value is reflected 
in abnormal earnings (Glaum, 2009) and models the market value of equity with the 
following: 
 MVE = α + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + β4 PCit + ε  (5) 
where NPE is owner’s equity plus pension liabilities, EbPC is earnings before pension 
costs, PLA is plan assets, PL is plan liabilities, and PC is pension costs. Most pension 
studies, including this one, are based upon Ohlson’s model. One advantage of this model 
is that we can see whether balance sheet information and income information are 
applicable to pension accounting information and how they relate to each other. As 
Glaum (2009) points out, the model is over specified. If, for instance, fair values are 
measured with sufficient reliability, there are no intangibles attached to them, and/or 
there are no synergies with other corporate assets and liabilities. With respect to 
accounting standards (such as SFAS 87, SFAS 132R, and SFAS 158), researchers can, 
using the Ohlson model with its combined balance sheet/income statement approach, 
answer the question of whether investors place more weight on information that is 
recognized as compared to information that is disclosed. 
Barth et al. (1993) is the first study to employ the Ohlson model in exploring how 
investors value pension information. They examine the relationship between balance 
sheet and income information by decomposing the elements of pension disclosures into 
their various components.  
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 EbPCit + β4 PLAit + β5 PLit + β6 INTit   
+ β7 SVCit + β8 RPLNAit + β9 DEFRETit + β9 ATRANSit + ε (6) 
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where Asset is the firm’s assets, liabilities is the firms’ liabilities, EbPC is net income 
before pension costs, PLA is plan assets, PL is plan liabilities, INT is interest cost, SVC 
is service cost, RPLNA is the actual rate of return on plan assets, DEFRET is the deferred 
return on plan assets and ATRANS is the amortization of the transition asset. They find 
that when pension balance sheet data is known, pension income statement data becomes 
redundant, i.e., it provides no additional information.  
Therefore, if pension accounting information has value relevance to investors and 
investors view pension assets and liabilities as belonging to the firm, I would expect the 
market to assign non-zero pricing multiples to the various pension asset and liability 
components (Barth et al. 1992). My first hypothesis (in alternative form) is thus: 
H1: Since the components of pension assets and liabilities represent various levels of 
risk and the securities markets perceive pension assets and liabilities to be assets and 
liabilities of the firm, the securities markets will assign different weights to the various 
components of pension assets and liabilities. 
Consistent with Wiedman and Weir (2004), I expect investors to view pension 
deficits (pension liabilities and costs) as liabilities of the firm but, due to legal restrictions 
limiting a firm’s ability to access pension surpluses, I expect investors to view pension 
assets as not belonging to the firm. Thus my second hypothesis (in alternative form) is:  
H2: Pension costs and liabilities are more strongly associated with the market value 
of equity than are the assets of a pension plan. 
However, consistent with Barth et al. (1993), I expect that when both balance sheet 
pension accounts and pension cost components are presented simultaneously, the pricing 
multiples on pension cost components (SVC, DEFRET and ATRANS) will be 
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insignificant (i.e., they provide redundant information to investors). Over specification 
may also lead to a decrease in value relevant information for pension liabilities. My third 
and fourth hypotheses (in alternative form) are thus: 
H3: Including both balance sheet information and income statement information in a 
single model will cause over specification of the model: i.e. some pension cost 
components (SVC, DEFRET, and ATRANS) will be redundant and thus not associated 
with firm value. 
H4: Including both balance sheet information and income statement information in a 
single model will cause over specification of the model: i.e., pension liability information 
will be somewhat redundant in explaining firm value and will decrease in explanatory 
power. 
Since firm value should respond to perceived levels of risk and return, investment in 
real estate and other assets (which include hedge funds) will be associated with the 
market value of equity at greater rates than investments in bonds and equities. My fifth 
hypothesis (in alternative form) is thus: 
H5: Due to higher perceived risk by investors, investment in real estate and others 
assets (which include hedge funds) will have greater weights (larger pricing multiples) 
than the pricing multiples on bonds and equity. 
This relationship may not however, hold for all economic environments. Due to the 
desire for safe harbors during times of economic downturn, it is likely investors will 
reward pension funds that increase their investments in bonds and equities during 
recessionary periods. My next hypothesis (in alternative form) is thus: 
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H6: During the recent financial crisis, pension plan investment in bonds and equity 
(representing lower risk and larger percentages of investment) will receive greater price 
multiples from investors than will pension plan investments in real estate and other 
assets.  
Finally, I examine whether investors interpret information differently based on 
presentation: recognition vs. disclosure. Adding to the extensive literature in this area, I 
predict that the pricing multiples on pension assets/liabilities/costs will be statistically 
different in the pre- and post-SFAS_158 periods. Pension liabilities and costs may 
decrease or lose significance to investors because they are presented simultaneously with 
more detailed pension asset information. Due to the volatility of the real estate market, I 
expect pension real estate assets to increase in importance. Due to increased volatility 
introduced into the financial statements by recognizing information in the body of the 
financial statements, I expect firms to increase their investment in bonds and to decrease 
their investment in equities, resulting in a concurrent change in the pricing multiples on 
bonds and equities (Amir et al. 2010; Chuk, 2011). My final hypothesis (in alternative 
form) is thus: 
H7: Due to a change in presentation (from disclosure to recognition), the pricing 
multiples on pension assets/liabilities/costs will be different in the pre- and post-SFAS 
158 periods.  
 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Financial and pension data were collected from Compustat (Fundamentals Annual 
and Pension Annual) while security prices were collected from CRSP. The sample firms 
 
 
19 
 
were required to be U.S. firms with defined benefit pension plans, that had total assets 
greater than pension assets, and with complete financial and pension data available. 
These screens resulted in 7,316 firm years for 1,188 individual firms. The data cover the 
period 2003 through 2011, a period in which firms were required to either disclose or 
recognize the composition of their pension assets and costs. Since I study the same cross-
sectional unit (in this case, firms) over time, I employ a panel data regression of the 
Ohlson clean surplus model (5). According to Baltagi (1998, p.7), panel data gives “more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency” while taking heterogeneity explicitly into account. Pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression often camouflages the heterogeneity (uniqueness) 
that may exist among firms, i.e., the individuality of each firm is subsumed in the 
disturbance term εt (Gujarati, 2003). I run a Hausman test and determine a fixed effects 
model fits the data better than a random effects model. One of the advantages of a fixed-
effects model is the ability to control for all time-invariant differences between individual 
firms, so that the models cannot be biased because of omitted time-invariant 
characteristics such as industry. 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics for 2003-2011 are presented in Table 1. Looking for 
evidence of the timing of the Financial Crisis, we notice a decline in total assets (TA) and 
pension assets (PAssets) in 2008 and 2009. There is also a decline in earnings and 
earnings before pension costs (EbPC) in 2008 with an increase in both for 2009. Interest 
costs (INT) and service costs are relatively stable for all years. There is, however, a 
negative rate of return on pension plan assets in 2008. Despite a relatively stable 
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percentage for investment in real estate, pension real estate values are higher in 2007 than 
in 2008. It appears then, that the financial crisis did not take effect until 2008 and most 
variables indicate the beginning of a recovery in 2009. 
Looking at the percentage changes (Table 2 and Figure 1) in the classes of pension 
assets, I find a decrease from 2007 to 2008 in the percentage of investments in equity 
holdings and a corresponding increase in the percentage of investments in bonds. This is 
consistent with managers of pension fund assets seeking a “safe harbor” in times of 
economic downturn. This gives further credence to the idea that the Financial Crisis 
began to be felt in 2008, not 2007.  
I begin my analysis by using a simple model in which the market value of equity 
at fiscal year-end is regressed on total assets, total liabilities, and earnings before 
extraordinary items.  
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 TAit + β2 TLit + β3 Earningsit + β4 AssetTurnit + β5 FinCrisisit  
   +β6 Fin_TAit + ε        (7) 
 
The results of this regression are presented in Table 3. I use fiscal year end values 
because they are measured on the same days as the dependent variables. As in Barth et al. 
(1992), using fiscal year end values requires an implicit assumption that earnings are 
reflected in the share price on that day. Other studies suggest that using this assumption 
about fiscal year-end prices is reasonable (Beaver et al., 1980; Collins and Kothari, 
1989). I control for the Financial Crisis at the firm level with asset turnover (AssetTurn) 
since an immediate decline in sales would be the likely result of an economic downturn, 
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while managers are less likely to be able to immediately adjust asset levels. I control for 
the Financial Crisis on an economy-wide basis using an indicator variable, Fin_Crisis, 
whose value is 1 for the years 2008 and 2009 and zero otherwise. I then interact 
Fin_Crisis with TA to evaluate the effect of the Financial Crisis on TA. The pricing 
multiples on TA, TL and Earnings are significant and of the expected sign. Also, as 
expected, as a firm’s AssetTurn rises so does the market value of equity (MVE). The 
effect of FinCrisis implies a flight of capital, behavior that is prompted by a financial 
crisis (Bernanke et al., 1996; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, 2008; Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2008 and Gelos and Wei, 2005).  
Using a version of the Ohlson Clean surplus model (equation (5)), I examine the 
effect of pension accounting information on MVE by separating liabilities into aggregate 
totals for pension (PenAssets) and non-pension assets (AbPA, total assets before pension 
assets), pension (PLiab) and non-pension liabilities (TLbPL, total liabilities before 
pension liabilities), and earnings before extraordinary items and pension costs (EbPC) 
and pension costs (Costs). 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCit + β4 PenAssetsit + β5 PCostsit  
+ β6 PLiabit + β7 AssetTurnit + β8 FinCrisisit + β9 Fin_AbPAit  
+ β10 Fin_PenAssetsit + ε       (8) 
 
Consistent with investors viewing pension assets, costs and liabilities as containing 
value relevant information, PAssets, PCosts, and PLiab are significantly correlated with 
MVE. As predicted by Wiedman and Wier (2004), pension liabilities have a greater 
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effect on MVE than do total liabilities of the firm before pension liabilities. This implies 
that investors view pension liabilities as belonging to the firm. On the other hand, the 
pricing multiple on pension assets is smaller than the pricing multiple on total assets 
before pension assets. This indicates that investors do not view pension assets as assets of 
the firm. This is probably due to the legal restrictions that prevent firms accessing 
pension assets for non-pension uses.  
The pricing multiple on pension costs is surprisingly positive. Barth et al. (1992) 
found a similar result with pension service costs and posited that this may be due to some 
pension costs not being viewed by the securities markets as a measure of pension 
liabilities, but instead acting as a proxy for the value created by human capital. The 
Financial Crisis is significant and negatively associated MVE. Once again, the significant 
negative pricing multiples on both non-pension and pension assets are indicative of a 
flight of capital (Bernanke et al., 1996; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, 2008; 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008 and Gelos and Wei, 2005).  
Expanding the model in Barth et al. (1993), I examine the incremental value 
relevance of the information revealed by the various components of both pension assets 
and liabilities. As per Barth et al. (1992), I decompose TAMOR into two principal 
components DEFRET (deferred return on plan assets) and ATRANS (the amortization of 
the transition asset).4 My test equation is: 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit  
+ β6 Real Estateit + β7 Other Assetsit + β8 PLiabit + β9 SVCit+ β10 INTit  
                                                 
4 Appendix A shows how to calculate DEFRET and ATRANS from SFAS 87 disclosures as per Barth et al. 
(1992). 
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+ β11 DEFRETit + β12 RPLNAit + β13 ATRANSit + β14 AssetTurnit   
+ β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_AbPAit + β17 Fin_Bondsit + β18 Fin_Equityit  
+ β19 Fin_RealEstateit + β20 Fin_OtherAssetsit + ε    (9) 
Consistent with Barth et al. (1993), I find that the explanatory value of pension cost 
components is limited once pension balance sheet information (pension assets) is 
included. The pricing multiple on pension liabilities, although significant and negative, is 
smaller than the pricing multiple on non-pension liabilities. As expected, when the actual 
return on plan assets increases, the market value of equity increases but its effect is much 
lower than that of earnings before pension costs. This is consistent with investors not 
considering pension surpluses to be assets of the firm. Consistent with this line of 
reasoning, I find that the pricing multiples on the different classes of pension assets are 
much lower than the pricing multiple on non-pension assets. While real estate assets 
comprise the smallest percentage of pension assets, they have the greatest weight with 
respect to the market value of equity. This indicates that investors recognize the riskiness 
of this class of assets and impound that into market values. The impact of the financial 
crisis is greater in this model, becoming more negatively associated with MVE. While the 
pricing multiple on non-pension assets is still negatively associated with MVE (once 
again implying a flight of capital), the percentages of pension assets invested in bonds 
and equity are significant and positively associated with MVE. The investment in real 
estate and other assets appears to contain no value relevant information for investors. 
Again, this may be due to the relatively large economic impact of bonds and equities that 
results from their comprising the vast majority of pension assets. 
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ADDITIONAL TESTS 
As I previously mentioned, the FDIC reported that the largest year-over-year decline 
in quarterly earnings occurred in the first quarter of 2007 (FDIC’s Quarterly Banking 
Profile). In August 2007, the U.S. subprime crisis began. Therefore, I re-run Model (9) 
after redefining the period of the Financial Crisis as 2007-09 (FinCrisis2).  The results of 
these tests are presented in Table 4. 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit  
+ β6 Real Estateit + β7 Other Assetsit  + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit  
+ β11  RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit + β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit  + β15 FinCrisis2it  
+ β16  Fin2_Equityit + β17 Fin2_Bondsit + β18  Fin2_RealEstateit  
+ β19 Fin2_OtherAssetsit  + β20 Fin2_AbPA + ε    (10) 
The results of this regression are presented in Table 4. 
While most pricing multiples are similar to those from Model (9), there are some 
notable exceptions. The power of both significant interest components (INT and RPLNA) 
is greater in this model, suggesting that pension costs are seen as contributing more to the 
market value of the firm while non-pension assets are seen as contributing less. The most 
noticeable difference between the two models is the change in sign of the coefficient on 
the financial crisis variable. When FinCrisis is defined as 2007-09, I find no association 
with market values. It is implausible that the financial crisis had no significant effect on 
firm values given that expected write-downs on global exposures were estimated to be $4 
trillion. This indicates that the financial crisis is misspecified when using the years 2007-
09 across all classes of assets. 
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In Model (11), I specify the Financial Crisis as 2007-09 for RealEstate and 2008-09 
for all other classes of assets (both pension and non-pension). Under this scenario, 
investment in other assets is significant and negative, meaning MVE increases as assets 
in this class are sold off. This is the only model in which the pricing multiple on other 
assets is significant. The pricing multiples on INT and RPLNA and PLiab decrease, 
indicating that investors are less likely to view pension liabilities and costs as belonging 
to the firm. At the same time, the pricing multiples on pension assets generally decrease. 
The pricing multiples increase on non-pension assets and liabilities as does the pricing 
multiple on non-pension earnings. Perhaps most disturbing is that the pricing multiple on 
the influence of the Financial Crisis is significant and positive. Thus these results indicate 
another misspecification of the financial crisis. I conclude, based on the results of the 
three different models of the financial crisis, that it is most likely the crisis occurred in 
the years 2008-09 with respect to the financial variables included in these models. 
I rerun the regression for model (9) using only firms with positive earnings before 
extraordinary items before pension costs (positive EbPC). The results are presented in 
Table 5. Wiedman and Weir (2004) find that funding status is more closely associated 
with stock prices for companies with underfunded pension plans as compared to firms 
with overfunded plans. Only four of the firm years in this sample are considered 
underfunded using their definition (PenAssets – PLiab >0). This is a much higher 
percentage of the sample than the sample of Canadian firms they employ for the years 
2000 and 2001 (their percentage of funded firms is 72% an 97%, respectively). I find that 
AssetTurn does not appear to provide value relevant information. The pricing multiple on 
the FinCrisis is significantly larger in magnitude than the pricing multiple for the sample 
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of all firms. It appears, therefore, that profitable firms were more negatively impacted 
(nearly five times greater) by the Financial Crisis than a sample of both profitable and 
unprofitable firms. This is consistent with profitable firms having more to lose (in terms 
of market value) in a period of economic downturn. Looking at the effect on pension 
costs for profitable firms, the actual return on pension assets loses its significance to 
investors while SVC is significant and negative and INT becomes more significantly 
negative. These results are not consistent with the findings of Barth et al. (1993) in which 
SVC has a positive correlation with MVE and RPLNA has a significantly positive 
correlation with MVE.  This may be due, however, to positive multicollinearity between 
pension cost components (Barth et al., 1992; Glaum, 2009). The effect of non-pension 
equity is less, as evidenced by smaller pricing multiples on non-pension assets and 
liabilities, while the effect of earnings is greater. At the same time, the pricing multiples 
on pension assets are greater (with the exception of real estate assets which declines), 
meaning pension assets exhibit a more positive relationship with the market value of 
equity than non-pension assets. This is consistent with investors viewing pension assets 
as being less risky than non-pension assets. 
Next, I evaluate the effect of pension accounting reform (a change in presentation) 
using 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit  
+ β6 Real Estateit + β7 Other Assetsit  + β8 PLiabit + β9 SVCit+ β10 INTit  
+ β11 DEFRETit + β12  RPLNAit + β13 ATRANSit + β14 AssetTurnit   
+ β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_AbPAit + β17 Fin_Bondsit + β18 Fin_Equityit  
+ β19 Fin_RealEstateit + β20 Fin_OtherAssetsit + ε    (9) 
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I estimate the pricing multiples for the pre- and post SFS 158 periods with a panel 
regression with fixed effects for each period, which allow separate slope pricing 
multiples for each firm in each period. I test the joint null hypothesis that pricing 
multiples for the pre- and post-SFAS periods are equal to one another and equal to zero. I 
reject the null hypothesis (β0 = β1 = ……= β20 = 0): the market does in fact assign value to 
the individual components.  The results of these estimates (and the following tests) are 
presented in Table 6. 
Finally, I test the whether the pricing multiples from the pre-SFAS 158 period are 
different from the pricing multiples from the post-SFAS 158. I reject the null hypothesis 
that the pricing multiples from pre-SFA 158 period equal from the pricing multiples from 
the post-SFS period (p = 0.000). This implies investors assign different market values 
based on a change in presentation (in this case, going from disclosure to recognition).  
I find that generally the pricing multiples on pension costs are insignificant, 
consistent with Barth et al. (1993) that income statement information is often redundant 
when presented simultaneously with balance sheet information. Although the pricing 
multiple on pension interest costs (INT) maintains significance, its coefficient is lower 
when information quality increases due to recognition. A similar effect is observed for 
the pricing multiple on pension liabilities (PLiab). 
The reaction to a change in presentation is, as predicted, mixed for the classes of 
pension asset. Real estate investments, the most volatile class of assets due to the 
subprime mortgage bubble in late 2006, has the largest increase in value assigned by the 
market, nearly twice the magnitude of change for bonds and equity. Consistent with Amir 
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et al. (2011) and Chuk (2010), due to a shift from equities to bonds, I find an increase in 
the pricing multiple for bonds from the pre- to post- period and a corresponding decrease 
in the pricing multiple for equities. I conclude from these results that the capital markets 
recognize a difference between recognition and disclosure, giving more weight to 
information that is recognized than to information that is disclosed. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the results of this study suggest that, for U.S. firms, in the years 2003-
2011, the securities markets found incremental information content in the composition of 
pension assets as provide by SFAS 132R and SFAS 158. Consistent with the findings of 
Barth et al. (1993), I find that for SVC, DEFRET and ATRANS the explanatory value of 
these pension costs becomes redundant once pension balance sheet variables are 
included. Consistent with prior literature, pension assets are not viewed as the property of 
the firm but pension deficits (pension liabilities and pension costs) are viewed as firm 
debts. During the Financial Crisis of 2008-09, managers of pension funds reduced 
investments in equity and increased investments in bonds. This may be due to pressures 
of recognition or because they were seeking less risky investments in a time of economic 
downturn. In addition, I find evidence that investors assign more significance to pension 
accounting information that is recognized in the financial statements than to pension 
information that is disclosed. 
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IV. ACCRUALS AND THE PREDICTION OF FUTURE CASH FLOWS 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESE DEVELOPMENT 
This study investigates the role of accruals in predicting future cash flows, using the 
market value of equity as a proxy for future cash flows. Prior pension research has shown 
that: (1) pension assets are not considered as property of the firm (Barth, et al., 1993); (2) 
despite pension assets not being viewed by investors as property of the firm, equities, the 
largest class of pension assets,  is correlated with future returns (Amir and Benartzi, 
1998); (3) pension liabilities are, however, viewed as belonging to the firm (Barth et al., 
1992); and (4) pension income statement information can often be redundant when 
presented with pension balance sheet information (Barth et al., 1993). As noted by Amir 
and Benartzi (1998), pension returns are economically significant and lead to higher 
overall rates of return for the firm.  
The model used in Barth et al., (2001a), is based on the Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) [DSS] for nondiscretionary accruals in event year t: 
ܰܦܣ௧	 =	∝ଵ 	 ቀ ଵ஺೟షభቁ +	∝ଶ (∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ −	∆ܴܧܥ௧) +	∝ଷ (ܲܲܧ௧)    (1) 
where:  
 ܣ௧ିଵ      = total Assets at t–1; 
∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ      = annual change in revenues in year t scaled by total assets at t-1; 
∆ܴܧܥ௧      = the annual change in net receivables in year t scaled by total assets at 
         t-1;  
ܲܲܧ௧        = the gross property plant and equipment in year t scaled by total assets 
          at t-1.  
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Estimates of the firm-specific parameters, ∝ଵ, ∝ଶ, and ∝ଷ are generated using the 
following model in the estimation period: 
ܶܣ௧	 = 	ܽଵ 	ቀ ଵ஺೟షభቁ +	ܽଶ(∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ −	∆ܴܧܥ௧) +	ܽଷ(ܲܲܧ௧) + 	νt    (2)
5 
where total accruals (ܶܣ௧) are calculated as: 
ܶܣ௧	 = 	∆ܥܣ௧ −	∆ܥܮ௧	−	∆ܥܽݏℎ௧ +	∆ܵܶܦ௧ −	ܦ݁݌௧)/	(ܣ௧ିଵ)    (3) 
where:  
 ∆ܥܣ௧      = the annual change in current assets; 
 ∆ܥܮ௧       = the annual change in current liabilities; 
 ∆ܥܽݏℎ௧					= the annual change in cash and cash equivalents; 
 ∆ܵܶܦ௧      = the annual change in debt included in current liabilities; 
ܦ݁݌௧       = depreciation and amortization expense; and 
ܣ௧ିଵ       = total assets. 
BCN disaggregates earnings into its major components: 
ܥܨ௜,௧ାଵ	 =	∝଴+	∝ଵ ܥܨ௜,௧ +	∝ଶ ∆ܣܴ௜,௧	+	∝ଷ 	∆ܫܰ ௜ܸ,௧ +	∝ସ ∆ܣ ௜ܲ,௧ +∝ହ ܦܧܴܲ௜,௧ 
+	∝଺ ܣܯܱܴ ௜ܶ,௧ +	∝ଶ ܱܶܪܧܴ௜,௧ +	ߝ௧      (4) 
where: 
 ܥܨ      = cash flow from operations; 
∆ܣܴ௜,௧       = the period-to-period change in accounts receivables; 
∆ܫܰ ௜ܸ,௧     = the period-to-period change in inventory; 
∆ܣ ௜ܲ,௧      = the period change in accounts payable; 
                                                 
5 I regress annually, based on one-digit SIC codes. I am unable to run annual regressions based on 2-digit 
SIC codes due to data limitations. However, the fixed effects regressions, employed in determining the 
associations between accruals and future cash flows, should control for industry effects. 
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ܦܧܴܲ௜,௧					=  depreciation expense; 
ܣܯܱܴ ௜ܶ,௧ = amortization expense; and  
ܱܶܪܧܴ௜,௧ = the aggregate of other accruals.6  
Following Barth et al. (2001a) and Nam et al. (2012), I designate the market value of 
equity [MVE] as a proxy for the present value of all future cash flows.  My benchmark 
model is thus: 
ܯܸܧ௧ାଵ =	∝଴+	∝ଵ ܯܸܧ௧ +∝ଶ 	ܣܥܥ௧ 	+ 	ߝ       (5) 
=	∝଴+	∝ଵ ܯܸܧ௧ +∝ଶ ∆ܣܴ௜,௧	+	∝ଷ 	∆ܫܰ ௜ܸ,௧ +	∝ସ ∆ܣ ௜ܲ,௧ +∝ହ ܦܧܲܣܯܱܴ௜,௧ 
	+	∝଺ ܱܶܪܧܴ௜,௧ +	ߝ௧        (6) 
As per Nam et al. (2012), I combine ܦܧܴܲ௜,௧ and ܣܯܱܴ ௜ܶ,௧ into a single 
variable	ܦܧܲܣܯܱܴ௧, representing depreciation and amortization expenses. My deflator 
is total assets. 
Since BCN (2001a) finds that aggregate components of prior cash flows and accruals 
mask information relevant for predicting future cash flows, disaggregating prior cash 
flows and accruals in their major components will increase investors’ ability to predict 
future cash flows. As per BCN (2001a), I predict that the pricing multiples on ChAP will 
be negative and that the pricing multiples on ChINV and ChAR will be positive. Given 
that depreciation and amortization are intended to match the costs of long-term assets and 
that firms presumably purchase these assets in order to increase cash flows, if matching is 
achieved between capital expenditures and their associated depreciation/amortization, the 
pricing multiple on DEPAMOR will reflect the expected positive return and be greater 
                                                 
6 OTHER = EARN  - (CF + ΔAR + ΔINV – ΔAP – DEPR – AMORT), where Earn is net income before 
extraordinary items 
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than zero. This should hold even if the return is lower than the firms’ cost of capital. My 
first hypothesis (in the alternative form) is thus: 
H1: Since the various components of accruals capture different information about 
delayed cash flows and future expected cash flows, the securities markets will assign 
different pricing multiples to the components of accruals. 
Value relevance studies like this one, are designed to determine which particular 
accounting amounts contain information that is used by investors to determine firms’ 
value (Barth et al., 2001b). In pension value relevance research, prior studies have tried to 
determine whether investors view pension funds as belonging to the firm, and if so, 
which pension components do investors view as relevant in determining firms’ market 
value (Daley, 1984; Landsman, 1986; Barth et al., 1992; Amir, 1996; Amir and Benartzi, 
1998; Barth et al.; 2001a; Barth et al., 2001b, just to name a few). Some have used a 
balance sheet approach and some have used an income statement approach. It was not 
until 1995, when Ohlson introduced the clean surplus model that pension research took 
into consideration both balance sheet and income statement measures simultaneously. 
The first model is the Daley (1984) cross-sectional equity model which uses an 
income statement approach by regressing the after-tax earnings before pension costs and 
after-tax pension costs on the market value of equity. 
MVEit = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 PCit + ε      (7) 
Where: 
EbPC  = after-tax earnings before pension costs; and  
PC  = after-tax pension costs.  
Daley concludes that pension expense may be impounded into equity prices. 
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Continuing with an income statement approach, Barth et al. (1992) explore whether 
the market assigns different pricing multiples to disaggregated pension cost components. 
They use an expanded version of equation (7) which takes into account SFAS 87 
requirement to decompose pension costs into four components.7 Their model takes the 
following form: 
MVE = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 INTit + β3 SVCit + β4 RPLNAit + β5 DEFRETit  
+ β5 ATRANSit + ε       (8) 
where:  
INT  = interest cost; 
SVC  = service cost; 
RPLNA = the expected return on plan assets; 
DEFRET  = the deferred return on plan assets; 
ATRANS  = the amortization of the transition asset; and  
EbPC is as defined as above.  
Not only do they find that investors assign different price multiples to the pension cost 
components (although they find the pricing multiple on ATRANS is not significantly 
different from zero), they argue that the generally larger price multiples on pension 
income streams when compared to the price multiples of non-pension income streams 
supports the idea that investors view pension income as less risky than other income.  
                                                 
7  Barth et al., (1992) further decompose TAMOR into DEFRET and ATRANS. Appendix A describes how 
to calculate these amounts and the relationship of the variables to each other. 
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Landsman (1986), by dividing assets and liabilities into pension and non-pension 
components, was the first to use the balance sheet approach in assessing the information 
content of pension accounting. The basic form of his model is: 
MVE = α + β1 NPAit + β2 NPLit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + ε      (9) 
where: 
NPA  = non-pension assets; 
NPL = non-pension liabilities; 
PLA  = plan assets; and  
PL  = plan liabilities.  
He also finds significant pricing multiples on pension assets and liabilities, and concludes 
that the securities markets value disclosed pension assets and liabilities similarly to 
recognized assets and liabilities. 
Building on the idea that accounting standards prevent the market value of equity 
from equaling the book value of equity (non-recognition of intangible assets such as 
those which are internally-generated and the incorporation of historical values which 
mask current market values), based on Ohlson (1995), Glaum (2009) explains how most 
subsequent pension studies have captured book value as reflected in abnormal earnings in 
the following model: 
 MVE = α + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + β4 PCit + ε  (10) 
where: 
NPE  = owner’s equity plus pension liabilities; 
EbPC  = earnings before pension costs; 
PLA  = plan assets; 
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PL   = plan liabilities; and  
PC  = pension costs.  
Employing this model we can see, for the first time, whether pension balance sheet 
information and pension income information are related to a firm’s market value and how 
they relate to each other, although in an efficient market, the model is over specified 
(Glaum, 2009). If, for instance, fair values are measured with sufficient reliability, then 
there will be no intangibles attached to them, and/or there are no synergies with other 
corporate assets and liabilities.  
Barth et al. (1993), by decomposing the elements of pension disclosures into their 
various components, is the first study to employ the Ohlson model in exploring how 
investors value pension information, in particular, the relationship between balance sheet 
and income information  There model is: 
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 EbPCit + β4 PLAit + β5 PLit + β6 INTit   
+ β7 SVCit + β8 RPLNAit + β9 DEFRETit + β9 ATRANSit + ε (11) 
where:  
Asset  = the firm’s assets; 
Liabilities  = the firms’ liabilities; 
EbPC  = net income before pension costs; 
PLA  = plan assets; 
PL   = plan liabilities; 
INT  = interest cost; 
SVC  = service cost; 
RPLNA  = the actual rate of return on plan assets; 
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DEFRET  = the deferred return on plan assets; and  
ATRANS  = the amortization of the transition asset.  
They find that when pension balance sheet data is known, pension income statement data 
becomes redundant, i.e., it provides no additional information.  
Based on the previous literature, my second hypothesis (in alternative form) is: 
H2: Investors view pension liabilities as being liabilities of the firm, thus pension 
liabilities will be negatively associated with expected future cash flows. 
Barth et al. (1993) find that pension balance sheet and income data information are so 
correlated that no additional information is provided by the income statement data once 
the balance sheet data is known. Therefore, my third hypothesis (in the alternative form) 
is: 
H3: Including both balance sheet information and income statement information in a 
single model will cause over-specification of the model. Thus most or all of the pension 
cost components will be redundant and not associated with expected future cash flows. 
Amir and Benartzi (1998) examine whether expected rates of return (ERR) and the 
percentage of pension assets invested in various classes of assets are correlated with 
future returns on pension assets and conclude that the percentage invested in equities is 
correlated with future returns. They find that ERR and the percentage of plan assets 
invested in equities are weakly correlated, and that only the percentage invested in equity 
is correlated with future pension returns. Asthana (2008) looks at the role of expected rate 
of return on pension assets under SFAS 87. Their data suggests that managers may inflate 
earnings per share (when they are going to miss earnings expectations) by inflating ERR 
and that this inflation is directly tied to the amount by which earnings will miss the target 
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and to earnings sensitivity. Given that pension returns are economically significant (for 
my dataset, on average, return on pension plans comprises about 61% of earnings), I 
expect managers to manage earnings by shifting the composition of the investment of the 
pension assets. I also expect managerial signaling/earnings management during the 2008-
2009 financial crisis, will result in changes in both the magnitude and sign of the pricing 
multiples during that period. My fourth, fifth and sixth hypotheses (in the alternative 
form) are thus:  
H4: Given that pension returns are economically significant for many firms and plan 
sponsors with more equity securities would employ higher expected rates of return, the 
percentage of pension assets invested in equities will be positively correlated with future 
expected cash flows. 
H5: Managers will signal/manage earnings using accruals during the 2008-2009 
financial crisis. This will result in changes in the pricing multiples of various components 
of pension assets during the recent financial crisis. 
H6: During recent financial crisis, a flight of capital from equities will result in a 
negative association between investments in equities and future cash flows. 
Finally, I examine how the impact of accounting information on future cash flows 
may differ with the information is disclosed rather than recognized. Kimbrough (2007) 
studies financial statement recognition and analyst coverage and finds them to be 
associated with firm value. Davis-Friday et al., (1999) study whether financial statement 
data is valued differently by financial markets if it is disclosed in the footnotes rather than 
recognized in the body of the financial statements. Using several valuations tests, they 
find that information that is recognized receives more weight than that which is disclosed. 
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The format with which information is presented also impacts the pricing multiples non-
professional investors place on that information (Maines and MacDonald, 2000). 
Specifically, they find that information on the volatility of unrealized gains is only taken 
into consideration by non-professionals when that information is formally presented in a 
statement of comprehensive income. Lehavy et al., (2011) analyze the complexity and 
readability of 10-K filings and find that “less readable 10-Ks are associated with greater 
dispersion, lower accuracy, and greater overall uncertainty in analyst earnings forecasts” 
(p. 1087), while Hodder, et al. (2008) find that something as simple as the structure of the 
indirect method of presenting operating cash flows can impede users’ information 
processing. My final hypothesis (stated in the alternative) is thus: 
H7: The change in presentation from disclosure to recognition, will be associated 
with different (greater) pricing multiples on pension assets/liabilities/ costs and accruals 
in the pre- versus post-SFAS 158 periods.  
 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Financial and pension data were collected from Compustat (Fundamentals and 
Pension Annual) while security prices were collected from CRSP. The sample firms were 
required to be U.S. firms with defined benefit pension plans, that had total assets greater 
than pension assets, and with complete financial and pension data available for three 
consecutive years.8 These screens resulted in 6,506 firm years for 1,098 individual firms. 
The data is collected for the period 2003 through 2011, a period in which firms were 
                                                 
8 Necessary to calculate lags 
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required to disaggregate the composition of their pension assets and costs. Since I study 
the same cross-sectional unit (in this case, firms) over time, I employ panel data 
regression of the balance sheet models for accruals. According to Baltagi (1998, p.7), 
panel data gives “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” while taking heterogeneity 
explicitly into account. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Regression often camouflages the 
heterogeneity (uniqueness) that may exist among firms, i.e., the individuality of each firm 
is subsumed in the disturbance term εt (Gujarati, 2003). I run a Hausman test and 
determine a fixed effects model fits the data better than a random effects model. One of 
the advantages of a fixed-effects model is the ability to control for all time-invariant 
differences between individual firms, so that the models cannot be biased because of 
omitted time-invariant characteristics such as industry. 
Combining the BCN balance sheet models of accruals (equations (5) and (6)) with the 
Ohlson Clean Surplus model (10) and the BBL model (11), my models for investigating 
whether aggregate pension components partially mask information related to future cash 
flows are: 
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPEt -1  + β2 EbPCt -1  + β3 PAt -1 +  β4 PCt -1  + β5 PLiabt -1  + β6 ACCt -1   
+ β7 AssetTurnt – 1 + β8 FinCrisist – 1 + β11 Fin_PAt – 1  + β12  Fin_PCt – 1  
+ β13 Fin_ACCt -1 + ε        (12) 
and  
 
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPEt -1  + β2 EbPCt -1  + β3 Bondst -1 + β4 Equityt -1  + β5 RealEstatet -1   
+ β6 OtherAssetst -1 + β7 SVCt -1 + β8 INTt -1  + β9 DEFRETt -1 + β10 RPLNAt -1   
+ β11 ATRANSt -1 + β12 PLiab t – 1 + β13 ChARt -1 + β14 ChINVt -1  + β15 ChAPt -1   
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+ β16 DEPAMORt -1  + β17 OtherACCt -1 + β18 AssetTurnt – 1 + β19 FinCrisist – 1 
+ β20 Fin_Bondst -1 + β21 Fin_Equityt -1 + β22  Fin_RealEstatet -1  
+ β23 Fin_OtherAssetst -1 + β24 Fin_SVCt -1 + β25 Fin_ INTt -1   
+ β26 Fin_ DEFRETt -1  + β27 Fin_RPLNAt -1  + β28Fin_ ATRANSt -1  
+ β29 Fin_ChARt – 1 + β30 Fin_ChINVt – 1  + β31 Fin_ChAPt – 1  
+ β32 Fin_DEPAMORt – 1 + β33 Fin_OtherACCt – 1 + ε   (13) 
where: 
   MVE  = Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1; 
NPE  = Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities; 
 EbPC  = Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs; 
 PA  = Pension assets: Equity + Bonds + RealEstate + OtherAssets; 
 Equity  = Pension assets invested in equities; 
 Bonds  = Pension assets invested in bonds; 
 RealEstate = Pension assets invested in real estate; 
 OtherAssets = Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate; 
 PLiab  = Market value of firm’s pension debt;  
 PC  = Pension costs: SVC + INT + DEFRET + RPLNA + ATRANS;  
 SVC  = Pension service costs; 
 INT  = Pension interest costs; 
 DEFRET = Deferred return on plan assets; 
 RPLNA = Actual return on plan assets; 
 ATRANS = Amortization of the transition asset; 
 ACC  = Accruals: NI before extraordinary items net of extraordinary  
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items/discontinued operations that affect cash flows;  
 ChAR  = Change in accounts receivable; 
 ChINV = Change in inventories; 
 ChAP  = Change in accounts payable; 
 DEPAMOR = Depreciation and amortization expense; 
 OtherACC = Other accruals: ACC – (ChAR + ChINV – ChAP +DEPAMOR); 
 AssetTurn = Sales divided by total asset; 
 FinCrisis = 1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise; 
 Fin_PA = Interaction between FinCrisis and PA; 
 Fin_Bonds = Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds;   
 Fin_Equity = Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity;  
 Fin_RealEstate= Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate; 
 Fin_OtherAssets= Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets; 
 Fin_PLiab = Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab;  
 Fin_PC = Interaction between FinCrisis and PC; 
 Fin_SVC = Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC;  
 Fin_INT = Interaction between FinCrisis and INT; 
Fin_DEFRET = Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET; 
Fin_RPLNA = Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA; 
Fin_ATRANS = Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS; 
 Fin_ACC = Interaction between FinCrisis and ACC;  
Fin_ChAR = Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAR; 
Fin_ChINV = Interaction between FinCrisis and ChINV; 
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Fin_ChAP = Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAP; 
Fin_DEPAMOR= Interaction between FinCrisis and DEPAMOR; 
Fin_OtherACC= Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherACC; and 
 Fin_AssetTurn = Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn 
 
 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics for 2004-2011 are presented in Table 7. The sample spans 
2002-2011 because the analysis relies on at least one year of future market value of 
equity and at least one year of change in accruals. It spans 2003-2011 because 
decomposition of pension assets was only required under FAS 132R and SFAS 158. The 
accrual components are calculated from balance sheet data. Following Sloan (1996), all 
variables are deflated by average total assets. The sample excludes financial services 
firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) because the model is not designed to reflect their activities 
(Barth et al., 2001a). Overall, although the use of individual components of pension 
assets, pension costs and accruals may help to increase prediction accuracy, the decrease 
in degrees of freedom may offset the benefits for cross-sectional analysis. Given the need 
to calculate lags, the results may also be affected by survivorship bias. 
Table 8 contains the percentages of pension assets invested in the 4 classes of assets 
as required by SFAS 132R and SFAS 158 (bonds, equity, real estate, and other assets). 
Figure 2displays the annual mean percentages in graphical form. I find a decrease in the 
percentage invested in equities and a corresponding increase in the percentage invested in 
bonds between 2007-2008. This is consistent with managers of pension fund assets 
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seeking a “safe harbor” in times of economic downturn. This shift may also, however, be 
due in part to the recognition requirements imposed by SFAS 158 (Amir et al., 2010; 
Fried, 2010; Chuk, 2011). 
Table 9 presents the regression estimates from equations (12) and (13), which test the 
association of the components of pension assets/liabilities, revenues/expenses with future 
cash flows (current market value of equity) and accruals. As expected, all pricing 
multiples of accruals, both aggregated and disaggregated with the exception of the 
change in inventories, are significant in predicting next period cash flows. It would be 
surprising if models containing accruals were not associated with future cash flows in a 
superior fashion than models employing prior cash flows alone. This is because accruals 
inherently contain information about future cash flows whereas prior cash flows do not. 
The signs are as predicted and consistent with Barth et al. (2001a). Since inventory can 
be stated in terms of the current change in revenues (Barth et al., 2001a), the insignificant 
pricing multiple of the change of inventories may be due to inventory disclosures 
containing redundant information. Comparing the associated R2s 9, model (13) with the 
disaggregated accruals, pension assets and pension liabilities has substantially more 
predictive ability than model (12) with aggregated amounts.  
Assessing the association of pension information with future cash flows (model 12), I 
find that none of the pricing multiples associated with pension assets (PA), pension 
liabilities (PLiab), or pension costs (PC) are significant. When the components as 
disaggregated into their individual components, however, we see not only an increase in 
                                                 
9 STATA provides three R-squares when running panel data regressions (xtreg): within, between, and 
overall.  Within represents the R-squared from the mean-deviated regression, i.e. the ordinary r-square from 
running OLS on the transformed data and is the one reported here. 
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overall predictability but also that the markets, in some cases, do assign significant 
pricing multiples to the individual components. Consistent with Amir and Benartzi 
(1998), investments in equities are significant to investors in predicting future cash flows. 
The pricing multiple is, however, small which implies that investors do not view pension 
assets as belonging to the firm. Pension liabilities are negatively associated with future 
cash flows. This suggests that investors view pension liabilities as belonging to the firms. 
As predicted, most pension cost pricing multiples are not significant when presented with 
balance sheet information. SVC is the exception. SVC is defined by the FASB as “the 
addition to the pension obligation attributable to services rendered by employees during 
the period” (Barth et al., 1992). The sign is surprisingly positive. Barth et al. (1992) 
found a similar result with pension service costs and posited that this may be due to some 
pension costs not being viewed by the securities markets as a measure of pension 
liabilities, but instead acting as a proxy for the value created by human capital. The long-
term horizon of this pension cost may also be a reason for its importance to investors, as 
the effects of the other pension costs have shorter lives or are susceptible to annual 
changes. 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis has a negative effect on future cash flows and the 
pricing multiple is greater when disaggregated accounting components are used. During 
the financial crisis, the model shows the predicted flight of capital (Bernanke et al., 1996; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, 2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008; and Gelos 
and Wei, 2005). Real estate pension assets are also negatively associated with future cash 
flows. This is a logical reaction to the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Increases in service 
costs and interest costs pricing multiples during the financial crisis are significant and 
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negative. The change in sign for the pricing multiple of service cost from the non-
financial crisis period may be viewed by investors as a signal from managers that value 
created by human capital declined during the period. All other pricing multiples for 
pension costs are not significantly different from zero, indicating that, in the presence of 
balance sheet information, the income statement information is considered redundant. 
 Once again, we see that investors value the incremental information contained in the 
individual components of accruals during the financial crisis. Again, the change in the 
sign may be due to signaling by managers. The sign of the pricing multiple on 
depreciation and amortization does not, however, change during the financial crisis. This 
may be due to the inability of managers to signal using a cost that is tied to the long-term 
rate of return on capital assets. An increase in accounts receivables during the financial 
crisis may, for example, signal that customers are slower to pay. Similarly, an increase in 
inventories during the crisis may be viewed by investors as resulting from lower 
inventory turnover. Similar inferences can be drawn for the change in accounts payable 
and other accruals. Differences in the magnitudes of the pricing multiples on accrual 
components are quite large when compared to the pricing multiples outside of the 
financial crisis. The absolute value of the changes ranges from 52.4% for depreciation 
and amortization expense to 181% for other accruals. This implies that investors were 
more concerned with accruals during the financial crisis. 
SFAS 158 does appear to have produced a significant overall change in the 
predictability of future cash flows (Table 10): i.e. investors view recognized accounting 
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amounts differently from disclosed amounts.10 The pricing multiples are not significantly 
different form zero for individual pension asset classes but the pricing multiple for net 
pension equity is significantly different in the pre- and post-periods - with a decrease in 
the weight on NPE following recognition. The pricing multiple for earnings before 
pension costs is also significantly lower in the post SFAS 158 period. Except for the 
expected rate of return on pension assets for which the pricing multiple is smaller in the 
post-SFAS period, investors view the information contained in the individual components 
of pension costs as being stale when presented along with balance sheet amounts. The 
same can be said of pension liabilities. There are, however, significant differences 
between ChINV and ChAP for the post- and pre-SFAS periods. When comparing the R2s 
of the pre- and post-SFAS 158 periods, we see that model (13), which includes 
recognized accounting amounts, has substantially more predictive ability than model (12) 
with disclosed accounting amounts. 
 
ADDITIONAL TESTS 
Dechow et al. (1995), [DSS], provides an alternative definition for comparing the 
power of aggregated accruals. Consistent with previous studies of earnings management 
(Healy 1985 and Jones, 1991), they compute total accruals (TA) as: 
ܶܣ௧	 = 	∆ܥܣ௧ −	∆ܥܮ௧	−	∆ܥܽݏℎ௧ +	∆ܵܶܦ௧ −	ܦ݁݌௧)/	(ܣ௧ିଵ)    (1) 
                                                 
10 I exclude the year 2006 from this model because the year 2006 includes MVE2006 period where SFAS 158 
was in effect while all other variables are for the year 2005 period when SFAS 158 was not in effect. 
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Discretionary accruals are then estimated using model (2) by subtracting the predicted 
level of nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) form total accruals (standardized by lagged 
total assets). 
ܶܣ௧	 = 	ܽଵ 	ቀ ଵ஺೟షభቁ +	ܽଶ(∆ܴܧ ௧ܸ −	∆ܴܧܥ௧) +	ܽଷ(ܲܲܧ௧) + 	νt    (2) 
Future cash flows are the estimated using aggregated and disaggregated pension 
components. 
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPE t -1  + β2 EbPC t -1  + β3 PA t -1 +  β4 PC t -1  + β5 PLiab t – 1  + β6 DA t -1    
+ β7 NDA t -1 + β8 AssetTurnt – 1 + β9 FinCrisis t – 1 + β10 Fin_PA t - 1  
+ β11 Fin_PCt – 1 + β12 Fin_DA t – 1 + β13 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε   (14) 
 
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPE t -1  + β2 EbPC t -1  + β2 Bonds t -1 + β3 Equity t -1  + β4 Real Estate t -1   
+ β5 Other Assets t -1 + β6 SVC t -1 + β7 INT t -1  + β8 DEFRET t -1  + β9 RPLNA t -1   
+ β10 ATRANS t -1  + β11 PLiab t – 1  + β12 DA t -1 + β13 NDA t -1 + β14 AssetTurnt – 1  
+ β15 FinCrisis t – 1 + β16 Fin_Bonds t -1  + β17 Fin_Equity t – 1  
+ β18  Fin_RealEstate t – 1 + β19 Fin_OtherAssetst – 1 + β20 Fin_SVC t -1  
+ β21 Fin_ INTt -1 + β22Fin_ DEFRETt-1 + β23 Fin_RPLNA t -1   
+ β24Fin_ ATRANS t -1 + β25 Fin_DA t – 1 + β26 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε  (15) 
where:  
DA = discretionary accruals as calculated by the Modified Jones Model; 
NDA = nondiscretionary accruals as calculated by the Modified Jones Model; 
and all other variables are as previously specified. The results of these tests are presented 
in Table 11. 
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Comparing the R2s with the R2s obtained using Model (12) and Model (13), we see 
the incremental information contained in the individual components of accruals as 
defined by BCN increase the predictability of future cash flows when compared to the 
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals employed in DSS. 
Using aggregate accounting amounts for pension assets and costs, Model (14) 
indicates that investors value pension disclosures by assigning differing pricing multiples 
to pension assets, liabilities and costs. The pricing multiple of pension assets is 
significant and small, consistent with investors, while valuing the incremental 
information of pension assets, choosing not to treat those pension assets as belonging to 
firms. The pricing multiple on pension costs is not statistically different from zero. This is 
consistent with the information provided by pension costs being redundant when 
presented with balance sheet information. The large significant pricing multiple on 
pension liabilities is consistent with investors viewing pension liabilities as belonging to 
the firm and thus, of help in predicting future cash flows. 
Turning to the incremental information derived from disaggregating pension assets 
and costs into their individual components, we see similar results to the BCN Model (13). 
I find larger pricing multiples in this model when compared to BCN. The significance 
and magnitude of the pricing multiple on equities indicates that investors value the 
amount of pension assets invested in equities, but do not view these pension assets as 
belonging to the firm. As above, pension liabilities are viewed as belonging to firms and 
their power in predicting future cash flows increases when pension components are 
disaggregated. As in BCN, only service costs are valued by investors in predicting future 
cash flows. 
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Aggregated accounting amounts mask the effect of discretionary and 
nondiscretionary accruals. The pricing multiples for discretionary and nondiscretionary 
accruals are insignificant in the Model (14) which uses aggregated pension amounts. 
Consistent with prior literature (Subramanyam, 1996 and Bowen et al., 1987), however, 
(and assuming that the modified Jones model is able to correctly decompose total 
accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals) discretionary and 
nondiscretionary accruals have incremental value for investors in predicting future cash 
flows (Model 15). The pricing multiples on discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals 
are 36.188 and 0.001 respectively. Unlike Subramanyam (1996), however, the weight 
attached to discretionary accruals is much greater than the weight attached to 
nondiscretionary accruals. This indicates investors are assigning greater importance to the 
discretionary information being supplied by managers about future earnings.11  
Once again, the 2008-2009 financial crisis has a negative association with future cash 
flows, although the multiple is higher in this model than in BCN.  As with BCN, the 
model shows a flight of capital (Bernanke et al., 1996; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005, 
2008; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008 and Gelos and Wei, 2005) for equities and real 
estate assets. The increase in the pricing multiple for service costs during the financial 
crisis is significant and negative as before. Surprisingly, interest costs have a large 
significant positive pricing multiple. This may be caused by a correlation in balance sheet 
and income statement pension information. As before; other pricing multiples for pension 
                                                 
11 An alternative explanation is that this result may be due to measurement error arising from 
misspecification of the cross-sectional Modified Jones model (discretionary accruals may be contaminated 
with nondiscretionary components). 
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costs are not significantly different from zero, indicating the information is considered 
stale. 
 Looking at the effect of the financial crisis on accruals, the multiple on Fin_DA and 
Fin_NDA are similar in magnitude and sign to those in Model (14). This may signify that 
disaggregating pension assets and costs had little effect on the interaction between the 
financial crisis and accruals.  
As in BCN, SFAS 158 does appear to have produced a significant overall change in 
the predictability of future cash flows (Table 12): i.e. investors view recognized 
accounting amounts differently from disclosed amounts. As with BCN, the differences in 
pricing multiples on pension assets in the pre-and post-SFAS 158 periods are not 
significant but the pricing multiple for net pension equity (which is adjusted for the effect 
of pensions) is significantly different in the pre- and post- periods. The pricing multiple 
for earnings before pension costs is significantly lower in the post-SFAS 158 period 
when compared to the pre-SFAS 158 period. The pricing multiple for expected rate of 
return on pension assets decreases (meaning a smaller weight in the post-SFAS 158 
period) while the pricing multiple for service costs increases. There is no significant 
change in the information provided by pension liabilities. With respect to discretionary 
and nondiscretionary accruals, there are significant differences in nondiscretionary 
accruals while there is no significant change in the information provided by discretionary 
accruals. This is due to the rather large standard deviations associated with discretionary 
accruals when compared to comparably smaller standard deviations associated with 
nondiscretionary accruals. When comparing the R2s of the pre- and post-SFAS 158 
periods, we see that model (13) with recognized accounting amounts has substantially 
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more predictive ability than model (12) with disclosed accounting amounts. Thus, we 
conclude investors value recognized accounting information differently from disclosed 
accounting information. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Consistent with Barth et al. (2001a), the results of this study suggest that, for U.S. 
firms, in the years 2003-2011, aggregate accounting amounts mask how the components 
of earnings affect investors’ ability to predict future cash flows. Disaggregating pension 
earnings components and accruals results in an increase in predictive power. Each accrual 
component, with the exception of change in inventories, reflects different information 
relating to future cash flows. Consistent with Amir and Benartzi (1998), the pricing 
multiple on equities, the largest class of pension assets, is significant and positive. During 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis, investors placed a greater weight on the incremental 
information contained in the individual components of accruals. The change in the sign 
and magnitude of the effect of the accrual components may be the result of signaling by 
managers. The sign of depreciation and amortization does not, however, change during 
the financial crisis and may be due the inability of managers to signal using a cost that is 
tied to the long-term rate of return on capital assets. The inferences are robust to 
alternative specifications of accruals. In addition, I find evidence that investors assign 
more significance to pension accounting information that is recognized in the financial 
statements than to pension information that is disclosed.   
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V. FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION PLANS IN THE U.S 
PRIOR LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESE DEVELOPMENT 
In my final study, I examine the association between funding status and the market 
value of equity. With the recognition of actuarial gains and losses in comprehensive 
income, rates of return on pension assets have an economically significant impact on the 
book value of equity. 12 Funding status may also an impact on cash flows. Under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security ACT (ERISA) of 1974, firms with private 
employer-sponsored DB plans funded from 80 to 90 percent of pension obligations, may 
have to accelerate cash contributions to the plan. Accelerated cash contributions are 
unconditionally required if the funding rate is below 80 percent (Coronado and Sharpe, 
2003). The U.S. Pension Protection Act (2006) requires full funding status within 7 years 
(Amir et al., 2010). Therefore, pension funding, and the required cash to bring plans to 
funded status, may have a large impact on the value shareholders place on the sponsoring 
firm’s equity. I find that investors reward firms that have fully funded pension plans with 
higher market values as compared to firms with underfunded plans. I also find that the 
capital markets perceive larger firms to have higher levels of risk with respect to pension 
liabilities, i.e., underfunded pension plans are more negatively associated with market 
values for larger firms as compared to smaller firms. 
Prior literature has found that pension funding levels have an impact on pension asset 
allocations (Bader, 1991; Amir and Benartzi, 1998, 1999; Chuk, 2011; Amir et al., 2010; 
Fried, 2010). This research suggests that companies invest more in bonds while 
                                                 
12 For an example of the magnitude of this impact, on average, amounts equal to 61% of net income for the 
firms in this sample are provided by returns on pension assets. 
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decreasing investments in equities as a means of avoiding contributions to pension plans 
when cash flows are low (Friedman,1983; Bodie et al., 1984; Amir et al., 2010). My 
research adds to the literature by finding that firms with underfunded plans are rewarded 
by capital markets for investing in bonds rather than equities. The switch from equities 
may also, however, be tied to SFAS 158 and its required recognition of the asset and 
income components of pension plans. 
Barth et al. (1992) developed a model to investigate whether market participants 
assign different pricing multiples to pension cost components when determining security 
prices. Using an income approach, they use an expanded version of the Daley (1984) 
model which includes pension costs decomposed into the various components required 
by SFAS 87. Their model takes the following form: 
MVE = α + β1 EbPCit + β2 INTit + β3 SVCit + β4 RPLNAit + β5 DEFRETit  
+ β5 ATRANSit + ε       (1) 
where INT is interest cost, SVC is service cost, RPLNA is expected return on plan assets, 
DEFRET is the deferred return on plan assets, ATRANS is the amortization of the 
transition asset and EbPC is earnings before pension costs. They find that investors assign 
different price multiples to the pension cost components (although they find the pricing 
multiple on ATRANS is not significantly different from zero). The pricing multiples on 
pension income streams are generally larger than the price multiples of non-pension 
income streams. They argue that this supports the idea that investors view pension 
income as less risky than other income.  
Landsman (1986) was the first to use the balance sheet approach in assessing the 
information content of pension accounting. Based on the accounting equation that equity 
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is equal to assets minus liabilities, he divides the assets and liabilities into pension and 
non-pension components. The basic form of his equation is: 
MVE = α + β1 NPAit + β2 NPLit + β3 PLAit + β4 PLit + ε      (2) 
where NPA is non-pension assets, NPL is non-pension liabilities, PLA is plan assets and 
PL is plan liabilities. He finds significant pricing multiples on pension assets and 
liabilities, and concludes that the securities markets value disclosed pension assets and 
liabilities similarly to recognized assets and liabilities. 
Barth et al. (1993) is the first pension study to employ the Ohlson (1995) Clean 
Surplus model which combines both balance sheet and income statement information. 
Barth et al. (1993) [BBL] examine how investors value pension information. Using this 
model BBL examine the relationship between balance sheet and income statement 
information by decomposing the elements of pension disclosures into their various 
components.  
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 EbPCit + β4 PLAit + β5 PLit + β6 INTit   
+ β7 SVCit + β8 RPLNAit + β9 DEFRETit + β9 ATRANSit + ε (3) 
where: 
Asset   = the firm’s assets; 
liabilities = firms’ liabilities; 
EbPC   = net income before pension costs; 
PLA   = plan assets; 
PL   = plan liabilities; 
INT   = interest cost; 
SVC   = service cost; 
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RPLNA  = the actual rate of return on plan assets; 
DEFRET  = the deferred return on plan assets; and  
ATRANS  = the amortization of the transition asset.  
They find that when pension balance sheet data is known, pension income statement data 
becomes redundant, i.e., it provides no additional information.  
 Building on BBL, Weidman and Wier (2004), examine the role of the funded 
status of pensions, in explaining market values. They computed the funded status (FS) as 
PENASSET less PENLIAB. They find that investors appear to find the deficit arising 
from underfunded plans as a liability of the firm, but any surplus arising from over-
funded plans is not view as an asset of the firm. Their basic equation is: 
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 EbPCit + β4 FSit + β5 OVERit  
+ β6 FS*OVERit  + ε       (4) 
where: 
FS   = pension assets less pension liabilities; 
OVER  = to 1 when the funded status of the plan is positive (0 otherwise); and  
FS*OVER = the interaction between OVER and FS.  
Assets and Liabilities are not adjusted for pension plans as in BBL, while EbPC is 
defined as in BBL. Instead of over-funded pension plans, I chose to directly examine the 
effect of underfunded plans by using the indicator variable, UNDER which is equal to 1 
when the funded status of the plan is underfunded (0 otherwise).  
My first and second hypotheses (in the alternative) are: 
H1: Investors will view deficits in funding as liabilities belonging to the firm. 
H2: Investors will encourage firms with underfunded plans to become funded. 
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Gopalakrishnan  and Sugrue (1993) examine the relationship between the projected 
benefit obligation (PBO) and MVE. They note that during the early stages of the pension 
policy promulgation process, the FASB favored PBO, instead of the accumulated benefit 
obligation [ABO] as the appropriate measure of pension liability. However, when SFAS 
87 was issued, the FASB settled for the recognition of a “minimum liability” on the 
balance sheet (when ABO exceeds the fair value of plan assets). Gopalakrishnan  and 
Sugrue (1993) find that investors perceive PBO as a liability of the firm, consist with the 
FASB’s notion (1985, para. 149) that the PBO provides a more realistic measure of the 
employer’s obligations on a going concern. Their model is based on Landsman (1986), 
substituting PBO for PLiab: 
MVE = α + β1 Assetit + β2 Liabilities + β3 PLAit + β4 PBOit + ε   (5) 
Where: 
PBO = the projected benefit obligation, and all other variables are as previously 
defined.  
Bader (1991) tests the effect of funding policy on asset allocation and finds funding 
has an inverted U-shaped relation with the percentage of pension funds allocated to 
equities. He argues that firms attempt to minimize the volatility of their pension 
contributions: plans that are extremely overfunded and underfunded should invest in 
bonds. In determining whether expected rates of returns or the percentage of pension 
assets allocated to equities is correlated with future returns on pension assets, Amir and 
Benartzi (1998) state that,  
It is expected, rather than the actual, return that affects reported income. For 
example, an increase in ERR will cause a decrease in net pension expense, and 
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hence, an increase in reported net income. Differences between the assumed and 
actual returns do not enter the income statement unless they exceed a cutoff of 10 
percent of the larger of PBO or the fair value of pension assets. (p.337) 
They find ERR (expected earnings return on pension assets) and the percentage of 
pension assets allocated  to equities are related weakly and only the percentage of equity 
is correlated with future returns on pension assets.  
Amir and Benartzi (1999) find managers prefer fixed-income investments rather than 
equity investments when they are close to recognizing an additional minimum pension 
liability. Amir and Benartzi (1999) also find firms allocate their pension assets between 
equities and fixed income investments to reduce volatility. Amir et al. (2009) define 
pension funding status as the fair value of pension assets divided by ABO. They find after 
the passage of SFAS 158, companies on average, shifted funds from equities to bonds 
and that this shift is related to changes in funding levels and the expected impact of SFAS 
158. Companies offset firm risk by using a more conservative pension asset allocation 
(more bonds).  
My third, fourth and fifth hypotheses (in the alternative) are: 
H3: When pension plans are under underfunded, the market will reward more 
conservative pension allocation such as investment in debt securities and fixed income 
instruments. 
H4: The expected rate of return on pension assets will be positively associated with 
the market value of the firm. 
H5: Pension income, while positively associated with the market value of the firm, 
will not be perceived as belonging to the firm. 
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With the passage of SFAS 132R, pension asset allocations must be disclosed. The 
FASB requires pension assets be allocated to four classifications: bonds13; equity 
securities; real estate; and other assets. Other assets are the amounts not invested in 
equities, bonds or real estate and include hedge fund assets. Prior studies find that 
managers may be inclined to divest equities and invest in bonds in order to reduce the 
likelihood of making cash contributions to their pension plans when the plans are 
extremely underfunded or overfunded (Friedman, 1983; Bodie et al., 1984; Amir et al., 
2009). 
Given this shift in pension asset allocation, I expect that investing in equities will be 
negatively associated with firm value. Larger firms generally have higher operating risk 
and may be unable to offset the risk represented by underfunded pension plans. Small 
changes in pension assumptions (expected rate of return, service costs, etc.) and pension 
asset allocation can produce a large impact on the firm’s net income. This is especially 
true for firms possessing large pension funds (Amir et al., 1998, demonstrate this using 
American Airlines). I expect the market will recognize that the risks associated with 
unfunded pension plans will less detrimental to the market value of equity for smaller 
firms when compared to larger firms. 
I examine the relationship between market value of equity and the allocation of 
pension asserts to see if investors reward a shift from equities to other investments and 
add to the literature that examines whether the method of accounting presentation 
(recognition vs. disclosure) affects pension asset allocation. I expect the pricing multiple 
                                                 
13 The amount invested in fixed income securities, cash and short-term securities, U.S. government and 
government agency securities, corporate bonds and notes, and mortgages. 
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on investments in equities to be negative. My sixth and seventh hypotheses (in the 
alternative form) are thus: 
H6: Investors will reward firms who invest their pension assets more conservatively 
(i.e. investment in equities will be negatively associated with firm value). 
H7: Due to the associated risks of managing large pension funds and the potential 
impact on net income, smaller firms will be perceived as being better able to handle the 
risk associated with underfunded pension plans. 
Finally, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 was in large part caused by the collapse of 
the sub-prime mortgage market. With total expected write-downs on global exposures 
being estimated at about $4 trillion, I expect the financial crisis to have a negative impact 
on firms. I also expect investors will want mangers to focus more on core operations as 
opposed to the funded status of pensions. My final hypotheses (in the alternative) are 
thus:  
H8: During the Financial Crisis, investments of pension assets in real estate will be 
negatively associated with firm value. 
H9: Investors will want managers to focus on increasing core operations. As a result, 
firms with underfunded pension plans will be less penalized during the financial crisis. 
H10: Investors will want managers to focus on increasing core operations. As a result, 
investors will discourage firms from becoming funded during the financial crisis. 
 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Financial and pension data were collected from Compustat (Fundamentals Annual 
and Pension Annual) while security prices were collected from CRSP. The sample firms 
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were required to be U.S. firms with defined benefit pension plans that had complete 
financial and pension data available. These screens resulted in 6,226 firm years for 1,170 
individual firms. The data cover the period 2003 through 2011, a period in which firms 
were required to 1) disclose and then later to 2) recognize the composition of their 
pension assets and costs. Since I study the same cross-sectional unit (in this case, firms) 
over time, I employ a panel data regression of the Ohlson clean surplus model (5). 
According to Baltagi (1998, p.7), panel data gives “more informative data, more 
variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency” while taking heterogeneity explicitly into account. Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares Regression often camouflages the heterogeneity (uniqueness) that may exist 
among firms, i.e., the individuality of each firm is subsumed in the disturbance term εt 
(Gujarati, 2003). I run a Hausman test and determine a fixed effects model fits the data 
better than a random effects model. One of the advantages of a fixed-effects model is the 
ability to control for all time-invariant differences between individual firms, so that the 
models cannot be biased because of omitted time-invariant characteristics such as 
industry. 
Extending Barth et al. (1993), and Weidman and Wier (2004), I regress market value 
of equity on disaggregated pension asset allocation as required by SFAS 132R and SFAS 
158. Pension assets are classified into 4 classes: bonds, equities, real estate and other 
assets (which include hedge funds, mortgage-backed securities, and private placement). 
Table 13 presents the percentages of asset classifications by year. Figure 3 plots the 
classifications graphically. Overall, stocks and bonds comprise between 91.2% and 
94.4% of total pension funds.  
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As in Weidman and Wier (2004), I examine whether funded status has value for 
investors and whether market value is more strongly associated with stock price for 
underfunded plans than for over-funded plans. I expect investors to reward firms that are 
funded and to encourage firms that are underfunded to become funded. This is consistent 
with firms viewing pension liabilities as belonging to the firm. 
Since Barth et al. (1993) find that no additional information may be provided by 
income statement data when balance sheet information is presented, I limit pension cost 
components to prior service costs and interest costs, which have been found to be 
significant in several studies. Consistent with Barth et al. (1992), I predict the pricing 
multiple will be positive for service costs (they posit it acts as a proxy for increases in 
human capital). I make no prediction for interest costs.  
Since the market value of equity takes into account investors’ expectations for future 
cash flows, I control for expected, rather than actual, returns on pension assets. As stated 
by Amir and Benartzi (1998), “(i)t is the expected, rather than the actual, return that 
affects reported income” (p.337). I expect a positive association with firm value for 
expected returns but at the same time, I expect the pricing multiple to be smaller than the 
pricing multiple for core earnings. This is consistent with investors viewing pension 
earnings as not belonging to the firm.  
I also seek to answer the question of whether funding levels affect pension asset 
allocation. Prior research (Friedman,1983; Bodie et al., 1984; Amir et al., 2009) suggests 
that companies invest more pension assets in bonds to offset high levels of risk. Investing 
in bonds may also be a means of avoiding contributions to pension plans when cash flows 
are low (Amir et al., 2009). Given this shift in pension asset allocation, I expect that 
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investing in equities will be negatively associated with firm value. For underfunded 
firms, investment in bonds will be encouraged by the market. Larger firms generally have 
higher operating risk and may not be able to offset the risk represented by underfunded 
pension plans (Amir et al., 2009). Thus I expect the market will recognize that the risks 
associated with unfunded pension plans can be more detrimental to the market value of 
large firms as compared to the market value of small firms. 
I next control for the effects of the financial crisis on funding levels and pension asset 
allocation. Given that a major cause of the 20008-2009 financial crisis was the collapse 
of the sub-prime mortgage market, I expect investors to encourage a divestment in 
pension real estate holdings. Given the need to concentrate on core operations, I expect 
investors, while still rewarding firms with funded pension plans and encouraging those 
firms who have unfunded plans to become funded, to focus less on funding pension plans 
(the pricing multiple will become less negative).  
Finally, I examine the value relevance between recognized and disclosed accounting 
information. Schipper (2007, p. 304) notes: “First, because recognition is subject to 
special criteria, and because SFAC No. 5 states that disclosure and recognition are not 
substitutes, it is evident that disclosure and recognition are not financial reporting 
alternatives—they are not intended to serve the same purpose.” I expect significant 
differences pre- and post- SFAS 158 periods and that these results will be robust to 
various scenarios of the timing of the financial crisis.  
I test value relevance with the following equation: 
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5  Real Estateit  
+ β6 Other Assetsit  + β7 Fundedit  + β8 Underit + β9Under_Fundedit 
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+ β10 Under_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12  INTit + β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit   
+ β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit + β18 Fin_Bondsit + β19 Fin_Equityit 
+ β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit  + β22 Fin_Underit  
+ β23 Fin_Fundedit + β24 Fin_Under_Fundedit   + ε    (6) 
where  
 MVE   = Fiscal year-end market value of common equity; 
 NPE    = Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common 
shares outstanding; 
 EbPC  = Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by 
   common shares outstanding; 
 Bonds  = Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares  
outstanding;  
 Equity  = Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares  
outstanding; 
 RealEstate  = Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares  
outstanding; 
 OtherAssets  = Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled  
by common shares outstanding; 
 Funded  = Pension assets divided by Accumulated Benefit Obligation,  
PA/ABO;  
 Under  = 1 if Funded < 1, 0 otherwise; 
 Under_Funded = Interaction term for Under and Funded; 
 Under_Bonds  = Interaction term for Under and Bonds; 
 SVC   = Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding; 
 INT   = Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding; 
 EXPRET  = Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares  
outstanding;  
 Div   = Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding; 
 Size   = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 size_Under  = Interaction term for size and Under; 
 FinCrisis  = If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise; 
 Fin_Bonds  = Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds; 
 Fin_Equity  = Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities; 
 Fin_RealEstate = Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate; 
 Fin_OtherAssets = Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in  
equities, bonds, or  real estate; 
 Fin_Under  = Interaction between FinCrisis and Under; 
 Fin_Funded  = Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded; 
 Fin_Under_Funded = Interaction between FinCrisis and Under and Funded; and 
 N   = Number of firm years. 
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RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 14. On average, pension funds are 
funded at the 77.91%, meaning, on average, most pension funds are not fully funded for 
the sample. In fact, of the 6832 firm years, 6226 represent unfunded pension plan years 
(91.1% of the firm years). A closer look at the funded status of firms reveals, however, 
that at the 90% and 80% funded levels, percentages of firms with unfunded pension 
accounts decrease to 78.6% and 57.2%. Regression estimates are presented in Table 15. 
For my model, I defined funded as being funded as plan assets divided by accumulated 
benefit obligation: PA/ABO (Amir et al., 2010). 
As expected, non-pension book value and non-pension earnings (NPE and EbPC) are 
positively associated with market value. In regards to pension asset allocation, I find that 
the market rewards firms who decrease their investment in equities, thereby more closely 
aligning pension assets with pension obligations. Equities represent the largest class of 
pension assets. All other pension asset pricing multiples are not significantly different 
from zero.  
I find the relationship between funded status and market value to be statistically 
insignificant using both a linear and a non-linear (untabulated) model. Consistent with 
Wiedman and Weir (2004) who find, for Canadian firms, that the funded status of 
pension plans is more strongly associated with firms’ market values for underfunded 
plans, I find that the market assigns a negative pricing multiple to firms with underfunded 
pension plans. The pricing multiple on becoming funded (Funded) is not significant. 
The market, in turn, rewards firms who seek to decrease their pension liabilities, i.e. 
the pricing multiple on Under_Funded is large and positive. Under_Funded represents the 
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effect of adjusting a firm’s funded status, for firms with underfunded pension plans in 
comparison to firms with funded/overfunded plans that similarly increased their funded 
status. The positive pricing multiple suggests that investors assign a higher pricing 
multiple to firms with underfunded plans who increase their funded status when 
compared to firms with funded/overfunded plans who increase their funded status.  
I also find evidence that suggests, for underfunded plans, the market rewards a 
reduction in risk and a decrease in volatility as evidenced by an increase in bonds for 
underfunded plans. Consistent with the idea that a more conservative asset allocation 
(investing more pension assets in bonds) can ensure that a minimum pension liability will 
not need to be recognized (Amir, et al., 2009) as well as offset high corporate risk 
(Friedman, 1983 and Bodie et al.,1984), I find that investors assign a positive pricing 
multiple to firms with underfunded pension plans that invest in bonds (Under_Bonds). 
This is also consistent with several prior studies (Bader, 1991; Amir and Benartzi,1998 & 
1999), that find firms have an inverted-U relation between funding levels and the 
percentage invested in equities (i.e. extremely underfunded/overfunded plans invest in 
bonds to minimize the volatility of future pension contributions).  
Consistent with Barth et al. (1992), service costs, which proxy for increases in human 
capital, are positively associated with market values. Consistent with Barth et al. (1995), 
pension income statement information, because of its high correlation to pension balance 
sheet information, provides no additional information (the pricing multiple on INT is not 
significantly different from zero).  
Because of the corridor effect, which allows firms to avoid recognizing the 
differences between assumed and actual returns on the income statement (unless they 
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exceed a cutoff of 10 percent of the larger of the fair value of pension plans or the 
projected benefit obligation), I find the expected rate of return affects reported income 
and subsequently, the market value of equity (Amir and Benartzi, 1998). I also note that 
while the pricing multiple on expected returns on pension plans (EXPRET) is positive 
and highly significant, it is substantially smaller than the positive and significant pricing 
multiple on earnings before pension costs (EbPC). This is consistent with legal 
limitations on firms’ ability to access pension surpluses. A firm may not be able to fully 
realize the benefits of a pension surplus, so the market does not consider the surplus to be 
an asset of the firm (Wiedman and Weir, 2004).  
I also find that the market perceives larger firms to have greater risk with regard to 
pension liabilities, i.e. having an underfunded pension plan is more detrimental to market 
value for larger firms than for smaller firms. Given the magnitude of these pricing 
multiples, investors view pension liabilities (in this case, liabilities arising from 
underfunded pension plans) as belonging to the firm. Given how even small changes in 
pension asset allocation can lead to changes in the expected rate of return on pension 
plans, which in turn leads to substantial changes in funding levels (especially for firms 
with large pension to equity ratios), firm value has the expected negative association with 
firm size for firms with underfunded pension plans when compared to firms that have 
funded or overfunded pension plans.  
Again, as expected, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 has a negative impact on the 
market value of equity while dividend payout was positively associated with firm value. 
One of the causes for the financial crisis of 2008-2009 was the decline of real estate 
prices caused by the sub-prime mortgage crisis. As a result, increased real estate holdings 
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are negatively associated with the market value of equity. It does not appear, however, 
that the financial crisis had an impact on the pricing multiples of the other classes of 
pension assets. 
Interestingly, during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the pricing multiple of Funded is 
less negative and becoming funded for firms with underfunded plans is associated with 
decreases in firm value.14 The message investors appear to be sending to firm managers is 
to cover your pension obligations as best you can during the financial crisis but not at the 
expense of core operations.  
 
ADDITIONAL TESTS 
Alternative Measure of Funded 
In Model (1), I define Funded as plan assets divided by accumulated benefit 
obligation: PA/ABO (Amir et al., 2010). Weidman and Weir (2004) define funded as 
pension assets less pension liabilities. I modify their measure to reflect the percentage of 
funding (100 * (1 +((PA – PBO) /PBO)).15 The results for Model (2) are given in Table 
16. 
Several pricing multiples in Model (2) have similar magnitudes and the same sign as I 
found in Model (1) (NPE, EbPC, Equity, Under_Bonds, SVC, EXPRET, Div,     
                                                 
14 During the financial crisis, the combined pricing multiple (Under + Fin_Under) is -1293.12, compared to 
-7881.015 (Under). For the combined pricing multiple on underfunded firms who are adjusting the funded 
percentage of their pension plans during the financial crisis, the change goes from having a positive 
association with firm value outside of the financial crisis (4069.536) to having a negative association with 
firm value during the crisis (-1856.6).  
15 For instance, if plan assets are valued at $110m, the PBO is $100m., then Funded = 100 * (1 +((PA – 
PBO) /PBO)) = 100 * (1 +((110 – 100)/100)) = 100* (1.1) = 110%. 
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Fin_RealEstate). Others are insignificant (RealEstate, OtherAssets, INT, Fin_Bonds, 
Fin_Equity, and Fin_OtherAssets). While the other pricing multiples generally maintain 
the same sign, implying similar conclusions to those drawn by Model (1), there are some 
differences between the magnitudes of the estimates for the pricing multiples. While the 
explanatory ability of Model (2) is greater is greater than Model (1) (as evidenced by the 
R2s), there are apparent problems with misspecifications in Model (2). 
In terms of pension asset allocation, the pricing multiple on bonds is significantly 
negative in Model (2). With the pricing multiples on the two largest classes of pension 
assets being negatively associated with market value and no corresponding positive 
pricing multiples on real estate or other pension assets, it is unclear just how investors 
would prefer firms to allocate pension assets.  This appears to be a misspecification of the 
model. 
A second problem arises with the pricing multiples on Funded2, Under2 and 
Under2_Funded2. Increasing the funded percentage is positively associated with MVE (it 
is insignificant in Model (1)) and the pricing multiple on Under2 is much smaller than the 
pricing multiple on Under (Model (1)). The effect of becoming funded when a firm has 
an underfunded pension fund becomes insignificant. Model (2) suggests that investors are 
rewarding all firms who increase their funded status and penalizing all firms with 
underfunded pension plans while not encouraging firms with underfunded plans to 
become funded.  
Other differences involve larger pricing multiples (size_Under2, FinCrisis, and 
Fin_Funded2) or a smaller pricing multiple (Fin_Under_Funded2). Overall, the estimates 
for Model (2  lead to the same conclusions as drawn from Model (1). 
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Recognition vs. Disclosure 
Using both definitions of funded, I find there is a significant difference between the 
pre- and post-SFAS period. In regards to pension asset allocation, investment of pension 
assets in real estate declined in value as did the effect of investing in bonds and size for 
firms with underfunded pension plans.  Income items, such as service costs and expected 
returns for pension items, have also decreased in information content. Given the decrease 
in pricing multiples and the resulting magnitudes for pension assets and income streams, 
it appears that investors do not view pension assets and earnings as belonging to the firm.  
Tables 17 and 18 present the results of my tests for differences between disclosure 
and recognition. The decrease in the magnitude of the pricing multiples on SVC implies 
that the contribution of human capital declined with recognition. The pricing multiples on 
Under_Bonds, EXPRET, and size_Under also decreased significantly. These changes are 
accompanied by smaller standard deviations (not tabulated), implying investors may be 
more confident about the information due to recognition. Changes in the pricing 
multiples of the components of pensions in the pre- and post-SFAS 158 periods imply 
that recognition of pension components has permitted investors to further differentiate 
between core and pension earnings. Using various simulations, Coronado and Sharpe 
(2003), find large valuation errors occur for many firms when there is a failure to 
differentiate between core and pension earnings. This is especially true during a period 
where there is a steep decline in stock prices coupled with a drop in interest rates. As a 
result of the increased differentiation of pension assets, liabilities and earnings by 
investors, valuation errors may have decreased. Similar results are found using the 
alternative definition of Funded in Model (2). I conclude from these results that the 
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capital markets recognize a difference between recognition and disclosure, giving more 
weight to information that is recognized than to information that is disclosed. 
 
Alternative Timing of Financial Crisis 
In my models, I define the financial crisis as occurring in the years 2008 and 2009 for 
all classes of pension assets. However, the U.S. subprime crisis began in August 2007 
and may have caused investors to treat real estate pension investments differently in 2007 
when compared to other classes of assets (Model (4)). On the other hand, since the 
subprime crisis had such a dramatic effect on the entire economy, perhaps the effects of 
the economic downturn were being felt by all classes of pension asset investment in 2007 
as well as 2008-2009 (Model (3)). I test Equation (6) under both scenarios. The results of 
these tests are presented in Table 19. 
Looking at the R2s, both Model (3) and Model (4) have lower explanatory value than 
Model (2). In Model (3), in which the financial crisis is defined as occurring in 2007-
2009, the effect of the financial crisis is not significantly different from zero. Since it is 
implausible that the financial crisis had no significant effect on firm values given that 
expected write-downs on global exposures were estimated to be $4 trillion, this would 
indicate that the financial crisis is misspecified when using the years 2007-09 across all 
classes of assets. All other pricing multiples have the same sign and are generally similar 
in magnitude. However, the magnitude of the effect of the financial crisis on firms with 
underfunded plans is about 75% less than when the financial crisis is defined as 2008-
2009. Also, the effect of becoming funded for underfunded firms during the financial 
crisis is 43% less using this alternative timing of the financial crisis. Model (4) exhibits a 
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problem similar to Model (3): the pricing multiple on the financial crisis is not 
significantly different from zero, with similar differences on Fin_Under and 
Fin_Under_Funded. For these reasons, defining the financial crisis as occurring in 2008-
2009 seems to present a more realistic view of the effect of the economic downturn than 
do either of the alternative definitions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Examining a sample of U.S. firms with defined benefit pensions plans from 2003-
2011, this study investigates how investors view the deficit arising from under-funded 
plans. I conclude that funded status does have an effect on pension asset allocation and 
that investors encourage conservative pension asset allocation to mitigate firm risk 
associated with underfunded pension plans. Due to the increased visibility caused by the 
recognition of pension assets, liabilities and earnings, investors have rewarded firms who 
have decreased their risk by allocating a smaller proportion of pension assets to equities. 
During the financial crisis of 2008-2009, investors also encouraged a decrease in 
investments in real estate.  
Investors view deficits arising from under-funded plans as belonging to the firm. 
Investors reward firms with fully or over-funded pension plans and encourage those 
funds with unfunded pension plans to become funded. During the financial crisis of 2008-
2009, while funding percentage continued to be negatively associated with market value, 
being unfunded had less negative consequences for firms in terms of market value. 
Becoming funded during the financial crisis was actually associated with a decrease in 
firm value.  
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Due to the associated risks of managing large pension funds and the potential impact 
on the net income of firms, smaller firms are perceived by capital markets as being better 
able to handle the risk of underfunded pension plans. The expected rate of return on 
pension assets, while, positively associated with MVE, is not viewed as belonging to the 
firm.  
In regards to disclosure versus recognition, I find that there are significant differences 
pre- and post- SFAS 158. These results are robust to various scenarios of the timing of 
the financial crisis and an alternative measure of funded. As a result of the increased 
differentiation between pension assets, liabilities and earnings, by investors, valuation 
errors may have decreased (information content increased) as evidenced by smaller 
pricing multiples on pension components coupled with smaller standard errors.  
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
 
This dissertation adds to the discussion of whether pension information is value 
relevant. As stated by Barth et al. (2001), "An important role of accountants is to 
summarize or aggregate information that might be available from other sources. Note 
also that the concepts of value relevance and decision relevance differ. In particular, 
accounting information can be value relevant but not decision relevant if it is superseded 
by more timely information." The data suggest that investors do, in fact, value the 
incremental information contained in disaggregated pension costs and assets. I find this 
holds whether examining pension information by itself or in the context of accruals or 
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pension funding levels. Pension information is significantly associated with the market 
value of equity. 
 My first study adds to the literature on whether investors value balance sheet 
information or income information to a greater extent. Consistent with Barth et al. (1993), 
this study is one of the first to find that the explanatory value of pension cost components 
is redundant once pension balance sheet items are disaggregated into their individual 
components. This study also contributes to the literature because it is one of the first to 
examine the effect of the incremental information provided by the disaggregation of 
pension plan assets into individual investment classifications before, during, and after the 
financial crisis of 2008-09. Finally, this study contributes to the literature by suggesting 
that recognized accounting information is more relevant to investors than accounting 
information that is disclosed.  
My second study finds disaggregated pension earnings components and accruals 
contain incremental information that investors value—specifically, disaggregated pension 
components increase predictive powers in regards to future cash flows. Aggregate totals 
mask how the components of earnings affect investors’ ability to predict future cash 
flows. Signaling by managers, during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, results in a 
change in the sign and magnitude of the effect of the pricing multiples of accrual 
components, with investors placing a greater weight on the individual components of 
accruals. Nevertheless, the sign of depreciation and amortization does not change during 
the financial crisis.  This is probably due to the inability of managers to signal using a 
cost that is tied to the long-term rate of return on capital assets. 
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My third essay deals with whether investors are paying attention to funding levels. 
The period under study, 2003-2001, represents the first time funding levels were either 
disclosed (SFAS 132R) or recognized (SFAS 158). I find the market rewards firms who 
have funded pension plans and at the same time, rewards firms who increase their funded 
levels. During the financial crisis, I find investors are more concerned with core earnings. 
During this time, firms were less negatively impacted by their unfunded status and 
increasing the funded level appears to decrease the market value of equity. Investors 
reward conservative pension investment plans, by encouraging divestment in equities and 
rewarding investment in bonds when plans are underfunded. I add to the literature by 
showing that funded levels not only affect the market value of equity but pension asset 
allocation. Once again, I show that pension assets are not considered as belonging to the 
firm while pension liabilities (in this case, underfunded pension plans) are perceived as 
belonging to the firm. 
In all 3 studies, I find that there are significant differences disclosed and recognized 
accounting information. These results are robust to various scenarios of the timing of the 
financial crisis. Most significantly, I find that. valuation errors may have decreased 
(information content increased) as evidenced by smaller pricing multiples on pension 
components coupled with smaller standard errors. I find that there are significant 
differences pre- and post- SFAS 158. These results are robust to various scenarios of the 
timing of the financial crisis and an alternative measure of funded. This result appears to 
be driven by the passage of SFAS 158.  
My findings may thus be of interest to standard-setters in that I raise the question of 
whether the direct increase in the quality of pension information resulting from the rule 
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change (recognizing various classes of pension assets/liabilities) is of greater value than 
the indirect costs (introducing volatility into the financial statements through recognizing 
net surpluses/deficits and actuarial gains/losses).  
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ACCOMPANYING TABLES 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form a 
 
aMVE  Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 TA  Total Assets 
 TL  Total Liabilities 
 Earnings Income before extraordinary items 
 AbPA  Total assets before pension assets 
 TLbPL  Total liabilities before pension liabilities 
 EbPC  Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs 
 PAssets  Total pension assets 
 PCosts  Total pension costs 
 PLiab  Market value of firm’s pension debt 
 Equity   Pension assets invested in equities 
 Bonds  Pension assets invested in bonds 
 RealEstate Pension assets invested in real estate 
 OtherAssets Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
 INT  Pension interest costs 
 SVC  Pension service costs 
 RPLNA Actual return on plan assets 
 DEFRET Deferred return on plan assets 
 ATRANS amortization of the transition asset 
 AssetTurn Sales divided by total assets 
 N  Number of firm years 
 2003-2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-11 
Variable Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
Mean Std. 
dev. 
MVE 34.80 51.94 38.87 60.18 25.10 45.78 31.01 52.40 37.73 76.76 
TA 42.18 59.81 45.15 67.33 44.87 72.29 44.54 73.75 49.55 92.48 
TL 27.19 40.65 28.38 34.09 29.48 34.99 27.80 33.28 30.83 39.67 
Earnings 1.69 6.39 1.96 6.06 0.67 6.54 1.19 3.80 2.28 9.95 
AbPA 35.67 53.86 38.10 61.88 39.72 68.93 39.04 69.53 42.91 87.36 
TLbPL 23.27 36.89 27.53 32.72 27.63 32.68 25.98 31.10 28.72 36.46 
EbPC 1.94 6.51 2.14 6.28 0.81 6.71 1.43 4.15 2.53 10.33 
PAssets 651.82 1184.86 704.71 1390.9 515.09 915.73 549.96 954.99 664.03 1254 
PCosts 1.47 2.72 1.27 2.34 -0.59 1.70 1.18 2.58 1.30 2.67 
PLiab 3.93 7.55 0.85 2.10 1.85 3.37 1.82 3.17 2.11 4.46 
Bonds 186.61 359.36 219.21 525.03 191.78 362.22 204.19 364.12 258.11 476.3 
Equity 419.70 767.85 431.83 860.09 273.86 544.38 295.21 594.98 345.23 817.0 
RealEstate 12.93 64.71 14.82 74.89 11.58 40.26 9.20 32.20 11.77 43.98 
OtherAssets 32.58 158.28 38.85 142.52 37.86 117.27 41.37 124.66 48.91 146.2 
INT 0.42 0.70 0.41 0.69 0.42 0.66 0.42 0.65 0.43 0.73 
SVC 0.19 0.28 0.16 0.28 0.15 0.27 0.14 0.28 0.14 0.32 
RPLNA 0.73 1.47 0.59 1.21 -1.35 2.64 0.50 1.68 0.56 1.60 
DEFRET 5.59 10.35 6.50 12.70 8.84 16.17 5.36 13.21 6.25 12.86 
ATRANS -5.45 10.03 -6.39 12.48 -8.75 15.87 -5.23 13.03 -6.09 12.68 
AssetTurn 1.10 0.691 1.08 0.70 1.15 0.78 0.99 0.68 1.02 0.69 
N 3191  883  854  827  1561  
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Table 3 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form  
(N=7316)c   
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 TAit + β2 TLit + β3 Earningsit + β4 AssetTurnit + β5 FinCrisisit +β6 Fin_TAit + ε (7) 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCit + β4  PenAssetsit + β5 PCosts + β6 PLiabit 
+ β7 AssetTurnit  + β8 FinCrisisit + β9 Fin_AbPAit + β10 Fin_PenAssetsit  + ε  (8) 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit  
+ β7 Other Assetsit  + β8 PLiabit + β9 SVCit+ β10 INTit + β11 DEFRETit + β12  RPLNAit  
+ β13 ATRANSit + β14 AssetTurnit  + β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_AbPAit + β17 Fin_Bondsit  
+ β18 Fin_Equityit + β19 Fin_RealEstateit + β20 Fin_OtherAssetsit + ε   (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, ***  Significance at .10, .05, .01.  
 
 
Variables Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
TA  0.688***   
TL -0.610***   
Earnings  1.142***   
AbPA   0.671***    0.697*** 
TLbPL  -0.625***   -0.587*** 
EbPC   1.184***    1.151*** 
PAssets   0.011***  
PCosts   0.156**  
PLiab  -0.725***   -0.364*** 
Bonds      0.022*** 
RealEstate      0.078*** 
Equity      0.018*** 
OtherAssets      0.031*** 
INT   -25.040*** 
SVC     -2.117 
RPLNA      0.491*** 
DEFRET     -0.853 
ATRANS     -1.018 
AssetTurn  2.342***  1.866**    3.101*** 
FinCrisis -0.321 -0.215***   -1.125** 
Fin_TA -0.154***   
Fin_AbPA  -0.150***   -0.149*** 
Fin_PA  -0.001***  
Fin_Bonds       0.005** 
Fin_Equity       0.004*** 
Fin_RealEstate      -0.014 
Fin_OtherAssets      -0.005 
Overall R2   0.8780   0.8830      0.8701 
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Table 3 (cont.)  
 
cMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 TA   Total Assets 
 TL   Total Liabilities 
 Earnings  Income before extraordinary items 
 AbPA   Total assets before pension assets 
 TLbPL   Total liabilities before pension liabilities 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs 
 PAssets   Total pension assets 
 PCosts   Total pension costs 
 PLiab   Market value of firm’s pension debt 
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
 INT   Pension interest costs 
 SVC   Pension service costs 
 RPLNA  Actual return on plan assets 
 DEFRET  Deferred return on plan assets 
 ATRANS  Amortization of the transition asset 
 AssetTurn  Sales divided by total assets 
 FinCrisis  If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise 
 Fin_TA   Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets 
 Fin_AbPA  Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets before pension assets 
 Fin_PA   Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets 
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 Fin_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan bonds invested in bonds 
 Fin_RealEstate  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 Fin_OtherAssets  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or   
real estate 
 N   Number of firm years 
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Table 4 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form  (N=7316)d to 
determine effect of various Financial Crisis periods on Asset classifications  
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit  
+ β7 Other Assetsit  + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit + β11  RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit  
+ β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit  + β15 FinCrisisit + β16  Fin_Equityit + β17 Fin_Bondsit  
+ β18  Fin_RealEstateit + β19 Fin_OtherAssetsit + β20 Fin_AbPA + ε  (9) 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit  
+ β7 Other Assetsit  + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit + β11  RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit  
+ β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit  + β15 FinCrisis2it + β16  Fin2_Equityit + β17 Fin2_Bondsit  
+ β18  Fin2_RealEstateit + β19 Fin2_OtherAssetsit  + β20 Fin2_AbPA + ε  (10) 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit  
+ β7 Other Assetsit  + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit + β11  RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit  
+ β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit  + β15 FinCrisis2it + β16  Fin2_Equityit + β17 Fin2_Bondsit  
+ β18  Fin_RealEstateit + β19 Fin2_OtherAssetsit  + + β20 Fin2_AbPA  +ε  (11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, ***  Significance at .10, .05, .01. 
Variables Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) 
AbPA    0.697***    0.663***    0.701*** 
TLbPL   -0.587***   -0.549***   -0.592*** 
EbPC    1.151***    1.337***    1.125*** 
PLiab   -0.364***   -0.236***   -0.355*** 
Bonds    0.022***    0.022***    0.022*** 
RealEstate    0.078***    0.082***    0.073*** 
Equity    0.018***    0.019***    0.017*** 
OtherAssets    0.031***    0.033***    0.031*** 
INT -25.040*** -29.304*** -24.578*** 
SVC   -2.117   -2.480   -1.543 
RPLNA    0.491***    0.820***   -0.521*** 
DEFRET   -0.853    0.684   -0.662 
ATRANS   -1.018    0.505   -0.823 
AssetTurn    3.101***    2.800***    3.066*** 
FinCrisis   -1.125**   
AbPA_Fin   -0.149***   
AbPA_Fin2    -0.109***   -0.157*** 
Fin_Bonds     0.005**     0.004* 
Fin_Equity     0.004***     0.003* 
Fin_RealEstate    -0.014   
Fin_Other Assets    -0.005    -0.008* 
FinCrisis2     0.223    0.912*** 
Fin2_Bonds     0.005**  
Fin2_Equity     0.005***  
Fin2_RealEstate    -0.015    0.005 
Fin2_Other Assets    -0.002  
Overall R2      0.8701     0.8671     0.8705 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
 
dMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 AbPA   Total assets before pension assets 
 TLbPL   Total liabilities before pension liabilities 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs 
 PAssets   Total pension assets 
 PCosts   Total pension costs 
 PLiab   Market value of firm’s pension debt  
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
 INT   Pension interest costs 
 SVC   Pension service costs 
 RPLNA  Actual return on plan assets 
 DEFRET  Deferred return on plan assets 
 ATRANS  amortization of the transition asset 
 AssetTurn  Sales divided by total assets 
 FinCrisis  if year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise 
 Fin_AbPA  Interaction between FinCrisis and total assets before plan assets 
 FinCrisis_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 FinCrisis_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan bonds invested in bonds 
 FinCrisis_RealEstate Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 FinCrisis_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or   
real estate 
 FinCrisis2  1 for years 2007-2009; 0 otherwise 
 Fin2_AbPA  Interaction between FinCrisis2 and total assets before plan assets 
 FinCrisis2_Equity Interaction between FinCrisis2 and plan assets invested in equities 
 FinCrisis2_Bonds Interaction between FinCrisis2 and plan bonds invested in bonds 
 FinCrisis2_RealEstate Interaction between FinCrisis2 and plan assets invested in real estate 
 FinCrisis2_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis2 and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or   
real estate 
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Table 5 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form  
(N=6093)e to determine effect of various Financial Crisis periods on Asset classifications; 
Firms with positive earnings only 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit  
+ β7 Other Assetsit  + β8 SVCit+ β9 INTit + β10 DEFRETit + β11  RPLNAit + β12 ATRANSit  
+ β13 PLiabit + β14 AssetTurnit  + β15 FinCrisisit + β16  FinCrisis_Equityit + β17 FinCrisis_Bondsit  
+ β18  FinCrisis_RealEstateit + β19 FinCrisis_OtherAssetsit  +  β20 Fin_AbPA + ε  (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, ***  Significance at .10, .05, .01.  
 
 
 
  
Variables Model (9) with 
positive earnings 
  
AbPA     0.591***   
TLbPL   -0.485***   
EbPC     3.041***   
PLiab   -0.137**   
Bonds     0.028***   
RealEstate     0.062***   
Equity     0.029***   
OtherAssets     0.036***   
INT -46.572***   
SVC   -5.135**   
RPLNA     0.282   
DEFRET     1.277   
ATRANS     1.285   
AssetTurn     0.126   
FinCrisis    -5.727***   
Fin_AbPA    -0.037***   
Fin_Bonds     0.009***   
Fin_Equity     0.004*   
Fin_RealEstate     0.012   
Fin_Other Assets     0.002   
Overall R2     0.9125   
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Table 5(cont.) 
 
eMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 AbPA   Total assets before pension assets 
 TLbPL   Total liabilities before pension liabilities 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs 
 PAssets   Total pension assets 
 PCosts   Total pension costs 
 PLiab   Market value of firm’s pension debt  
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
 INT   Pension interest costs 
 SVC   Pension service costs 
 RPLNA  Actual return on plan assets 
 DEFRET  Deferred return on plan assets 
 ATRANS  amortization of the transition asset 
 AssetTurn  Sales divided by total assets 
 FinCrisis  if year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise 
 Fin_AbPA  Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets before pension assets 
 Fin_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan bonds invested in bonds  
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 Fin_RealEstate  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 Fin_OtherAssets  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or   
real estate
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Table 6 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form  to determine the effect of SFAS 158 (N = 2272 for 
2003-2005 and N = 5044 for 2006-2011)f 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 AbPAit + β2 TLbPLit + β3 EbPCi+ β4 Equityit + β5 Bondsit + β6 Real Estateit + β7 Other Assetsit  + β8 PLiabit + β9 SVCit+ β10 INTit  
+ β11 DEFRETit + β12  RPLNAit + β13 ATRANSit + β14 AssetTurnit  + β15 FinCrisisit + β16 Fin_AbPAit + β17 Fin_Bondsit + β18 Fin_Equityit  
+ β19 Fin_RealEstateit + β20 Fin_OtherAssetsit + ε           (9) 
 
Variable16 AbPA TLpPL EbPC Bonds Equity RealEstate OtherAssets PLiab INT SVC RPLNA 
Pre SFAS 158 
2003-05 
1.419*** -1.298*** 0.723*** -0.001 0.026*** 0.031* 0.015** 0.031 -15.810*** 9.386* -1.672** 
Post SFAS 158 
2006-2011 
0.471*** -0.149*** 1.167*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.061*** 0.027*** -0.945*** -21.235*** -5.568* 0.040** 
Difference -0.948 1.149 0.444 0.017 -0.015 0.030 0.012 -0.976 -5.425 -14.954 1.712 
F (1, 6094) 44.03 71.92 47.60 19.25 12.48 4.81 0.29 5.47 11.28 0.08 2.19 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0004 0.590 0.019 0.0008 0.774 0.139 
Overall R2 = 0.8187 
 
Variable DEFRET ATRANS AssetTurn FinCrisis Fin_AbPA Fin_Bonds Fin_Equity Fin_RealEstate Fin_OtherAssets 
Pre SFAS 158 
2003-05 
2.281 3.342* 7.010***       
Post SFAS 158 
2006-2011 
-1.477* -1.582* 2.846*** -0.992* 0.003 0.003 0.005*** -0.18 -0.003 
Difference17 -3.758 -4.924 -4.164 - - - - - - 
F (1, 6094) 0.02 0.41 2.21 9.08 538.0 0.74 8.83 1.55 1.12 
Prob>F 0.521 0.521 0.0132 0.003 0.000 0.391 0.003 0.214 0.290 
Overall R2 = .8558 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 *, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
17 For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_AbPA, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_Other Assets, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
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Table 6 (cont.) 
 
H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β20 = 0 H0: AbPA1 = AbPA2 & TLbPL2 = TLbPL1…..& AssetTurn2 = AssetTurn1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_OtherAssets = 018 
F(34, 6094) = 253.98 F(20, 6094) = 56.48 
Prob>F = 0.000  Prob>F = 0.000 
 
fMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 AbPA   Total assets before pension assets 
 TLbPL   Total liabilities before pension liabilities 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs 
 PLiab   Market value of firm’s pension debt 
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
 INT   Pension interest costs 
 SVC   Pension service costs 
 RPLNA  Actual return on plan assets 
 DEFRET  Deferred return on plan assets 
 ATRANS  Amortization of the transition asset 
 AssetTurn  Sales divided by total assets 
 FinCrisis  If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise 
 Fin_TA   Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets 
 Fin_AbPA  Interaction between FinCrisis and Total assets before pension assets 
 Fin_PA   Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets 
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 Fin_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan bonds invested in bonds 
 Fin_RealEstate  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 Fin_OtherAssets  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or   
real estate 
 N   Number of firm years
                                                 
18 AbPA1 is the coefficient for AbPA in pre-SFAS 158 period, AbPA2 is the coefficient for AbPA in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and Fin2Crisis is the 
coefficient for FinCrisis in the post –SFAS 158 period, etc. 
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics (scaled by total assets); 2004-2011a 
N=6056 
 
Variable Mean St. dev. Variable Mean St. dev. 
MVEt 1.115   0.996 DEFRET t-1   0.143 0.190 
MVEt-1 1.039 0.864 RPLNA t-1   0.010 0.028 
NPE t-1 0.488 0.267 ATRANS t-1  -0.140   0.188 
EbPC t-1 0.046 0.090 ACC   0.041   0.092 
PA t-1 14.506 15.357 ChAR t-1   0.006   0.048 
Bonds t-1 4.695 5.706 ChINV t-1   0.005   0.035 
Equity t-1 8.755 9.627 ChAP t-1   0.004   0.033 
RealEstate t-1 0.250 0.845 DEPAMOR t-1   0.042   0.023 
OtherAssets t-1 0.806 2.641 OtherACC t-1   0.076    0.978 
PLiab t-1 0.066 0.098 AssetTurn t-1   0.059   0.221 
PC t-1 0.026 0.026    
SVC t-1 0.004 0.004 DA t-1  -6.76 e-06     0.0004 
INT t-1 0.010 0.010 NDA t-1  -0.0002   0.003 
          
 aMVE  Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1 
 NPE  Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities 
 EbPC  Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs 
 PA  Pension assets: Equity + Bonds + RealEstate + OtherAssets 
 Equity  Pension assets invested in equities 
 Bonds  Pension assets invested in bonds 
 RealEstate Pension assets invested in real estate 
 OtherAssets Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
 PLiab  Market value of firm’s pension debt  
 PC  Pension costs: SVC + INT + DEFRET + RPLNA + ATRANS  
 SVC  Pension service costs 
 INT  Pension interest costs 
 DEFRET Deferred return on plan assets 
 RPLNA Actual return on plan assets 
 ATRANS Amortization of the transition asset 
 ACC  Accruals: NI before extraordinary items less operating cash flows before  
extraordinary items and deprivation/amortization.  
 ChAR  Change in accounts receivable 
 ChINV Change in inventories 
 ChAP  Change in accounts payable 
 DEPAMOR Depreciation and amortization expense 
 OtherACC Other accruals: ACC – (ChAR + ChINV – ChAP +DEPAMOR) 
 AssetTurn Sales divided by total asset 
 NDA  Non-discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model 
 DA  Discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones model 
 N  Number of firm years 
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Table 8  
Mean Percentage of plan assets invested in various classes of Assets (2004-2011)b 
 
Year Variable Mean St.Dev. Year Variable Mean St.Dev.
2004 Bonds 30.855 13.128 2008 Bonds 32.106 14.824 
N = 502 Equity 63.695 14.136 N = 817 Equity 60.684 15.225 
 RealEstate   1.112   2.666  RealEstate   1.505   3.687 
 Other Assets   4.338 11.255  Other Assets   5.706  12.855
2005 Bonds 31.149 13.456 2009 Bonds 38.091 16.495 
N = 769 Equity 63.459 14.272 N = 797 Equity 53.018 16.361 
 RealEstate   1.107   3.193  RealEstate   1.698   3.919 
 Other Assets   4.285 10.319  Other Assets   7.194 14.811 
2006 Bonds 31.116 14.147 2010 Bonds 37.929 15.957 
N = 848 Equity 62.958 14.518 N = 773 Equity 53.676 17.224 
 RealEstate   1.341   3.456  RealEstate   1.370   3.218 
 Other Assets   4.585 10.307  Other Assets   7.025 14.123 
2007 Bonds 31.399 14.896 2011 Bonds 37.492 16.013 
N = 819 Equity 62.167 15.348 N = 731 Equity 54.389 16.954 
 RealEstate   1.443   3.582  RealEstate   1.288   3.075 
 Other Assets   4.991 11.323  Other Assets   6.831 13.870 
 
bBonds  Percentage of pension assets invested in bonds 
 Equity  Percentage of pension assets invested in equities 
 RealEstate Percentage of pension assets invested in real estate 
 Other Assets  Percentage of pension assets not invested in bonds, equities and real estate 
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Table 9  
Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by total assets (N=6056)c   
  
 
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPEt -1  + β2 EbPCt -1  + β3 PAt -1 +  β4 PCt -1  + β5 PLiabt -1  + β6 ACCt -1  + β7 AssetTurnt – 1  
+ β8 FinCrisist – 1 + β11 Fin_PAt – 1  + β12  Fin_PCt – 1 + β13 Fin_ACCt -1 + ε  (12) 
 
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPEt -1  + β2 EbPCt -1  + β3 Bondst -1 + β4 Equityt -1  + β5 RealEstatet -1  + β6 OtherAssetst -1  
+ β7 SVCt -1 + β8 INTt -1  + β9 DEFRETt -1 + β10 RPLNAt -1  + β11 ATRANSt -1 + β12 PLiab t – 1  
+ β13 ChARt -1 + β14 ChINVt -1  + β15 ChAPt -1  + β16 DEPAMORt -1  + β17 OtherACCt -1  
+ β18 AssetTurnt – 1 + β19 FinCrisist – 1 + β20 Fin_Bondst -1  + β21 Fin_Equityt -1   
+ β22  Fin_RealEstatet -1  + β23 Fin_OtherAssetst -1 + β24 Fin_SVCt -1 + β25 Fin_ INTt -1   
+ β26Fin_ DEFRETt -1  + β27 Fin_RPLNAt -1  + β28Fin_ ATRANSt -1 + β29 Fin_ChARt – 1  
+ β30 Fin_ChINVt – 1  + β31 Fin_ChAPt – 1 + β32 Fin_DEPAMORt – 1 + β33 Fin_OtherACCt – 1 + ε 
           (13) 
 
 
Variable Model 12 Model 13 
NPE t-1  0.641*** 0.760*** 
EbPC t-1  1.598*** 1.521*** 
PA t-1  0.004  
Bonds t-1  -0.002 
Equity t-1  0.008* 
RealEstate t-1  0.027 
OtherAssets t-1  0.005 
PLiab t-1 -0.149 -0.562*** 
PC t-1  0.727  
SVC t-1  14.040*** 
INT t-1  2.197 
DEFRET t-1  2.501 
RPLNA t-1  0.361 
ATRANS t-1  2.614 
ACC  0.843**  
ChAR t-1  2.743*** 
ChINV t-1  0.457 
ChAP t-1  -1.911*** 
DEPAMOR t-1  2.197** 
OtherACC t-1  0.854** 
AssetTurn t-1  0.266*** 0.187*** 
FinCrisis -0.188*** -0.248*** 
Fin_PA  0.006***  
Fin_Bonds   -0.006 
Fin_Equity   -0.019*** 
Fin_RealEstate   -0.006* 
Fin_OtherAssets  -0.009 
Fin_PC   -1.168  
Fin_SVC   -8.610* 
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Table 9 (cont.) 
Variable 
 
Model 12 
 
Model 13 
Fin_INT   32.547***    
Fin_DEFRET   -3.198   
Fin_RPLNA   -0.013 
Fin_ATRANS   -3.204 
Fin_ACC -2.843***  
Fin_ChAR   -5.558***   
Fin_ChINV   -5.558***  
Fin_ChAP   4.701*** 
Fin_DEPAMOR   3.348*** 
Fin_Oth   2.401*** 
Adjusted R2 0.1745 0.2032 
 
 
c  MVE  Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1 
 NPE  Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities 
 EbPC  Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs 
 PA  Pension assets: Equity + Bonds + RealEstate + OtherAssets 
 Equity   Pension assets invested in equities 
 Bonds  Pension assets invested in bonds 
 RealEstate Pension assets invested in real estate 
 OtherAssets Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
 PLiab  Market value of firm’s pension debt  
 PC  Pension costs: SVC + INT + DEFRET + RPLNA + ATRANS  
 SVC  Pension service costs 
 INT  Pension interest costs 
 DEFRET Deferred return on plan assets 
 RPLNA Actual return on plan assets 
 ATRANS Amortization of the transition asset 
 ACC  Accruals: NI before extraordinary items less operating cash flows before  
extraordinary items and deprivation/amortization.  
 ChAR  Change in accounts receivable 
 ChINV  Change in inventories 
 ChAP  Change in accounts payable 
 DEPAMOR Depreciation and amortization expense 
 OtherACC Other accruals: ACC – (ChAR + ChINV – ChAP +DEPAMOR) 
 AssetTurn Sales divided by total asset 
 FinCrisis 1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise 
 Fin_PA  Interaction between FinCrisis and PA 
 Fin_Bonds Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds   
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity  
 Fin_RealEstate Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate  
 Fin_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets 
 Fin_PLiab Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab  
 Fin_PC  Interaction between FinCrisis and PC 
 Fin_SVC Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC  
 Fin_INT Interaction between FinCrisis and INT 
 Fin_DEFRET Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET 
 Fin_RPLNA Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA 
 Fin_ATRANS Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS 
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 Table 9 (cont.) 
 
 Fin_ACC Interaction between FinCrisis and ACC  
 Fin_ChAR Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAR 
 Fin_ChINV Interaction between FinCrisis and ChINV 
 Fin_ChAP Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAP 
 Fin_DEPAMOR Interaction between FinCrisis and DEPAMOR 
 Fin_OtherACC Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherACC 
 Fin_AssetTurn Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn 
 N  Number of firm years 
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Table 10  
Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by Total Assets to determine the effect of SFAS 158 (N = 1271 for 2004-2005 
and N = 3937 for 2007-2011)d 
  
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPEt -1  + β2 EbPCt -1  + β3 Bondst -1 + β4 Equityt -1  + β5 RealEstatet -1  + β6 OtherAssetst -1 + β7 SVCt -1 + β8 INTt -1  + β9 DEFRETt -1 
 + β10 RPLNAt -1  + β11 ATRANSt -1 + β12 PLiab t – 1 + β13 ChARt -1 + β14 ChINVt -1  + β15 ChAPt -1  + β16 DEPAMORt -1  + β17 OtherACCt -1  
+ β18 AssetTurnt – 1 + β19 FinCrisist – 1 + β20 Fin_Bondst -1  + β21 Fin_Equityt -1  + β22  Fin_RealEstatet -1  + β23 Fin_OtherAssetst -1 + β24 Fin_SVCt -1  
+ β25 Fin_ INTt -1  + β26Fin_ DEFRETt -1  + β27 Fin_RPLNAt -1  + β28Fin_ ATRANSt -1 + β29 Fin_ChARt – 1 + β30 Fin_ChINVt – 1   
+ β31 Fin_ChAPt – 1 + β32 Fin_DEPAMORt – 1 + β33 Fin_OtherACCt – 1 + ε       (13) 
 
 
Variable19 NPE EbPC Bonds Equity RealEstate OtherAssets SVC INT RPLNA DEFRET ATRANS 
Pre SFAS 158 
2004-05 
0.924*** 3.427*** 0.010 0.014 0.049* 0.015 9.318 -2.699 3.353 4.239 6.245* 
Post SFAS 158 
2007-2011 
0.758*** 0.782* -0.001  0.012*  0.016  0.006  18.496*** 5.812 -4.116  -1.008 -1.111 
Difference -0.166 -2.645 -0.011 -0.002 -0.033 -0.009 9.178 8.511 -7.469 -5.247 -7.356 
F (1, 4072) 3.40 7.91 0.75 0.04 1.28 0.51 1.41 0.60 5.06 0.79 1.52 
Prob>F 0.065 0.005 0.386 0.834 0.258 0.475 0.236 .439 0.025 0.375 0.218 
  
 
 
Variable PLiab ChAR ChINV ChAP DEPAMOR OtherACC AssetTurn FinCrisis Fin_Bonds Fin_Equity 
Pre SFAS 158 
2004-05 
-0.383 1.778* -1.312 0.056 3.055** 0.024 -0.025     
Post SFAS 158 
2007-2011 
0.316 3.663*** 1.564** -3.388*** 2.185* 0.894**  0.352*** -0.179*** -0.007 -0.022*** 
Difference20 0.699 1.885 2.876 -3.444 -0.870 0.870 0.377    
F (1, 4072) 0.84 2.34 5.55 5.50 0.40 0.92 15.84 17.07 0.77 11.18 
Prob>F 0.360 0.127 0.019 0.019 0.527 0.338 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.001 
                                                 
19 *, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
20 For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
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Table 10 (cont.) 
Variable Fin_RealEstate Fin_OtherAssets Fin_SVC Fin_INT Fin_DEFRET Fin_RPLNA  Fin_ATRANS  Fin_ChAR Fin_ChINV  
Post SFAS 158 
2007-2011 
-0.036 -0.001 -6.997 22.676*** 0.593 4.627*** 0.786 -5.799*** -3.683*** 
F (1, 4911)21 2.238 0.88 1.38 10.20 0.01 2.91 0.02 66.19 28.98 
Prob>F 0.123 0.349 0.240 0.001 0.909 0.088 0.880 0.000 0.000 
 
Variable Fin_ChAP Fin_DEPAMOR Fin_OtherACC 
Post SFAS 158 
2007-2011 
5.512*** 2.938*** -1.744*** 
F (1, 4911) 22 35.36 13.43 52.18 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Adjusted R2 
Pre-SFAS 158:  0.0672 
Post-SFAS 158:  .2252 
 
H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β 33 = 0 
F (52, 4077) = 21.72 
Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
H0: NPE1 = NPE2 & EbPC2 = EbPC1…..& AssetTurn2 = AssetTurn1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_OtherAssets = 023 
F (33,  4077) =   18.64  
Prob>F = 0.000   
 
                                                 
21 For the variables Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
22 For the variables Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
23 NPE1 is the coefficient for NPE in pre-SFAS 158 period, NPE2 is the coefficient for NPE in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and Fin2Crisis is the coefficient 
for FinCrisis in the post–SFAS 158 period, etc. 
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Table 10 (cont.) 
 
c  MVE  Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1 FinCrisis 1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise 
 NPE  Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities    Fin_Bonds Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds 
 EbPC  Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs  Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity 
 Bonds  Pension assets invested in bonds     Fin_RealEstate Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate 
 Equity   Pension assets invested in equities     Fin_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets 
 Table 10 (cont.) 
 RealEstate Pension assets invested in real estate    Fin_PLiab Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab  
 OtherAssets Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate  Fin_SVC Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC  
 PLiab  Market value of firm’s pension debt     Fin_INT  Interaction between FinCrisis and INT 
 SVC  Pension service costs      Fin_DEFRET Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET 
 INT  Pension interest costs      Fin_RPLNA Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA 
 DEFRET Deferred return on plan assets     Fin_ATRANS Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS 
 RPLNA Actual return on plan assets     Fin_ChAR Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAR 
 ATRANS Amortization of the transition asset     Fin_ChINV Interaction between FinCrisis and ChINV 
 ChAR  Change in accounts receivable     Fin_ChAP Interaction between FinCrisis and ChAP 
 ChINV  Change in inventories      Fin_DEPAMOR Interaction between FinCrisis and DEPAMOR 
 ChAP  Change in accounts payable     Fin_OtherACC Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherACC 
 DEPAMOR Depreciation and amortization expense    Fin_AssetTurn Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn 
 OtherACC Other accruals: ACC – (ChAR + ChINV – ChAP +DEPAMOR) N  Number of firm years 
 AssetTurn Sales divided by total asset 
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Table 11  
Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by total assets (N=6056)e   
  
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPE t -1  + β2 EbPC t -1  + β3 PA t -1 +  β4 PC t -1  + β5 PLiab t – 1  + β6 DA t -1  + β7 NDA t -1  
+ β8 AssetTurnt – 1 + β9 FinCrisis t – 1 + β10 Fin_PA t - 1 + β11 Fin_PCt – 1 + β12 Fin_DA t – 1  
+ β13 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε        (14) 
 
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPE t -1  + β2 EbPC t -1  + β2 Bonds t -1 + β3 Equity t -1  + β4 Real Estate t -1   
+ β5 Other Assets t -1 + β6 SVC t -1 + β7 INT t -1  + β8 DEFRET t -1  + β9 RPLNA t -1  + β10 ATRANS t -1  
+ β11 PLiab t – 1  + β12 DA t -1 + β13 NDA t -1 + β14 AssetTurnt – 1 + β15 FinCrisis t – 1 + β16 Fin_Bonds t -1  
+ β17 Fin_Equity t – 1 + β18  Fin_RealEstate t – 1 + β19 Fin_OtherAssetst – 1 + β20 Fin_SVC t -1  
+ β21 Fin_ INTt -1 + β22Fin_ DEFRETt-1 + β23 Fin_RPLNA t -1  + β24Fin_ ATRANS t -1  
+ β25 Fin_DA t – 1 + β26 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε      (15) 
 
Variables Model (3) Model (4) 
NPE    0.675***    0.812*** 
EbPC    0.510***    0.508*** 
PA    0.007***  
Bonds    -0.002 
Equity     0.012** 
RealEstate     0.025 
OtherAssets     0.006 
PC    0.252  
SVC   16.371*** 
INT     6.243 
DEFRET     1.908 
RPLNA    -0.216 
ATRANS     2.059 
PLiab   -0.283**   -0.759*** 
DA  35.393    36.188*   
NDA    0.006    0.001 
AssetTurn    0.284***    0.189*** 
FinCrisis   -0.308***   -0.314*** 
Fin_PA    0.005**  
Fin_Bonds     -0.008 
Fin_Equity     -0.028*** 
Fin_RealEstate     -0.040** 
Fin_OtherAssets    -0.015* 
Fin_PC     -1.028  
Fin_SVC   -15.189*** 
Fin_INT    40.752*** 
Fin_DEFRET     -1.777 
Fin_RPLNA      0.573 
Fin_ATRANS     -1.806 
Fin_DA  79.692*  87.941* 
Fin_NDA   -1.718***    -1.472***   
Overall R2     0.1432    0.1648 
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Table 11 (cont.) 
 
e  MVE  Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1 
 NPE  Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities 
 EbPC  Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs 
 PA  Pension assets: Equity + Bonds + RealEstate + OtherAssets 
 Equity   Pension assets invested in equities 
 Bonds  Pension assets invested in bonds 
 RealEstate Pension assets invested in real estate 
 OtherAssets Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
 PLiab  Market value of firm’s pension debt  
 PC  Pension costs: SVC + INT + DEFRET + RPLNA + ATRANS  
 SVC  Pension service costs 
 INT  Pension interest costs 
 DEFRET Deferred return on plan assets 
 RPLNA Actual return on plan assets 
 ATRANS Amortization of the transition asset 
 NDA  Non-discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model 
 DA  Discretionary accruals calculated using the Modified Jones model 
 AssetTurn Sales divided by total asset 
 FinCrisis 1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise 
 Fin_PA  Interaction between FinCrisis and PA 
 Fin_Bonds Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds   
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity  
 Fin_RealEstate Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate  
 Fin_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets 
 Fin_PLiab Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab  
 Fin_PC  Interaction between FinCrisis and PC 
 Fin_SVC Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC  
 Fin_INT Interaction between FinCrisis and INT 
 Fin_DEFRET Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET 
 Fin_RPLNA Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA 
 Fin_ATRANS Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS 
 Fin_DA Interaction between FinCrisis and DA  
 Fin_NDA Interaction between FinCrisis and NDA 
 Fin_AssetTurn Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn 
 N  Number of firm years
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Table 12  
Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, scaled by Total Assets to determine the effect of SFAS 158 (N = 1271 for 2004-2005 
and N = 3937 for 2007-2011)f   
  
MVEt = β0  + β1 NPE t -1  + β2 EbPC t -1  + β2 Bonds t -1 + β3 Equity t -1  + β4 Real Estate t -1  + β5 Other Assets t -1 + β6 SVC t -1 + β7 INT t -1  + β8 DEFRET t -1   
+ β9 RPLNA t -1  + β10 ATRANS t -1  + β11 PLiab t – 1  + β12 DA t -1 + β13 NDA t -1 + β14 AssetTurnt – 1 + β15 FinCrisis t – 1 + β16 Fin_Bonds t -1   
+ β17 Fin_Equity t – 1 + β18  Fin_RealEstate t – 1 + β19 Fin_OtherAssetst – 1 + β20 Fin_SVC t -1 + β21 Fin_ INTt -1 + β22Fin_ DEFRETt-1  
+ β23 Fin_RPLNA t -1  + β24Fin_ ATRANS t -1 + β25 Fin_DA t – 1 + β26 Fin_NDA t – 1 + ε      (15) 
 
 
Variable24 NPE EbPC Bonds Equity RealEstate OtherAssets SVC INT RPLNA DEFRET ATRANS 
Pre SFAS 158 
2004-05 
0.971*** 3.034*** 0.008 0.013 0.049* 0.014 6.159 4.955 3.003 4.040 6.016* 
Post SFAS 158 
2007-2011 
0.796*** -0.008 -0.001 0.014** 0.011 0.007 21.345*** 9.396 -4.241 -0.167 -0.214 
Difference -0.175 -3.042 -0.009 0.001 -0.038 -0.007 15.186 4.441 -7.244 -4.207 -6.230 
F (1, 4081) 3.62 124.48 0.60 0.00 1.74 0.26 3.97 0.16 4.68 0.51 1.10 
Prob>F 0.057 0.000 0.440 0.954 0.187 0.613 0.047 0.688 0.031 0.474 0.293 
 
 
 
Variable PLiab DA NDA AssetTurn FinCrisis Fin_Bonds Fin_Equity Fin_RealEstate Fin_OtherAssets Fin_SVC 
Pre SFAS 158 
2003-05 
-0.441 13.818 -0.277 -0.042       
Post SFAS 158 
2007-2011 
0.119 1.358 1.402*** 0.354*** -0.203*** -0.008 -0.028*** -0.033 -0.014 -11.768** 
Difference25 0.56 -12.46 1.679 0.396       
F (1, 4072) 0.53 0.04 14.55 16.12 62.16 1.04 17.61 1.97 2.37 3.86 
Prob>F 0.467 0.840 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.161 0.124 0.050 
  
                                                 
24 *, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
25 For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
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Table 12 (cont.) 
 
Variable Fin_INT Fin_DEFRET Fin_RPLNA   Fin_ATRANS  Fin_DA Fin_NDA 
Post SFAS 158 
2007-2011 
28.386*** 0.727 4.864* 0.868 133.466** -2.776 
F (1, 4911) 26 15.79 0.02 3.15 0.03 4.12 49.13 
Prob>F 0.000 0.890 0.076 0.869 0.042 0.000 
 
Adjusted R2 
Pre-SFAS 158:  0.0607 
Post-SFAS 158:  0.1996 
 
H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β 33 = 0 
F (43, 4081) = 23.45 Prob > F = 0.000 
 
H0: NPE1 = NPE2 & EbPC2 = EbPC1…..& AssetTurn2 = AssetTurn1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_OtherAssets = 027 
F (27, 4081) = 18.97 Prob > F = 0.000   
 
f  MVE  Fiscal year-end market value of common equity at time t or t-1 FinCrisis 1 for years 2007, 2008, 2009, 0 otherwise 
 NPE  Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities    Fin_Bonds Interaction between FinCrisis and Bonds 
 EbPC  Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs  Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and Equity 
 Bonds  Pension assets invested in bonds     Fin_RealEstate Interaction between FinCrisis and RealEstate 
 Equity   Pension assets invested in equities     Fin_OtherAssets Interaction between FinCrisis and OtherAssets 
 RealEstate Pension assets invested in real estate    Fin_PLiab Interaction between FinCrisis and PLiab  
 OtherAssets Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate  Fin_SVC Interaction between FinCrisis and SVC  
 PLiab  Market value of firm’s pension debt     Fin_INT  Interaction between FinCrisis and INT 
 SVC  Pension service costs      Fin_DEFRET Interaction between FinCrisis and DEFRET 
 INT  Pension interest costs      Fin_RPLNA Interaction between FinCrisis and RPLNA 
                                                 
26 For the variables Fin_XXX, I am testing if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
27 NPE1 is the coefficient for NPE in pre-SFAS 158 period, NPE2 is the coefficient for NPE in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and Fin2Crisis is the coefficient 
for FinCrisis in the post–SFAS 158 period, etc. 
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 Table 12 (cont.) 
 
DEFRET Deferred return on plan assets     Fin_ATRANS Interaction between FinCrisis and ATRANS 
RPLNA  Actual return on plan assets     Fin_DA  Interaction between FinCrisis and DA 
ATRANS Amortization of the transition asset     Fin_NDA Interaction between FinCrisis and NDA 
DA  Discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model  Fin_AssetTurn Interaction between FinCrisis and AssetTurn 
NDA  Nondiscretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model  N  Number of firm years 
AssetTurn Sales divided by total assets 
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Table 13 Percentages of Classes of Pension Assetsa  
 
Year Variable Mean St. dev. Year Variable Mean St. dev. 
2003 Bonds  30.45 12.55 2008 Bonds 37.46 15.11 
N = 504 Equity  63.94 13.65 N = 731 Equity  53.73 14.92 
 RealEstate  1.09 2.63  RealEstate  1.77 4.06 
 OtherAssets  4.51 11.57  OtherAssets  7.05 13.35 
2004 Bonds  30.94 12.81 2009 Bonds  37.14 15.34 
N = 789 Equity  63.71 13.56 N = 753 Equity  54.63 16.41 
 RealEstate  1.07 2.64  RealEstate  1.34 3.12 
 OtherAssets  4.26 10.34  OtherAssets  6.90 13.11 
2005 Bonds  30.47 13.08 2010 Bonds  37.37 15.79 
N = 863 Equity  63.74 13.44 N = 763 Equity  54.64 16.75 
 RealEstate  1.26 2.90  RealEstate  1.26 2.95 
 OtherAssets  4.53 9.62  OtherAssets  6.73 12.81 
2006 Bonds  30.84 14.18 2011 Bonds  39.88 16.18 
N = 878 Equity  62.98 14.44 N = 748 Equity  51.76 17.03 
 RealEstate  1.45 3.32  RealEstate  1.145 3.08 
 OtherAssets  4.73 10.40  OtherAssets  6.91 12.14 
2007 Bonds  32.00 14.48     
N = 803 Equity  61.08 14.92     
 RealEstate  1.44 3.30     
 OtherAssets  5.47 12.05     
 
             Changes in the percentages for the classes of pension assets 
 Equity Bonds RealEstate OtherAssets 
2003-2005 -0.31% 0.10% 15.60% 0.44% 
2006-2011 -17.82% 29.27% 0.00% 46.09% 
Overall -19.05% 30.97% 33.03% 53.22% 
 
 
a Equity   Percentage of plan assets invested in equities 
  Bonds  Percentage of plan assets invested in bonds 
  RealEstate Percentage of plan assets invested in real estate 
  OtherAssets Percentage of plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate 
  N  Number of firm years 
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Table 14 
Descriptive statistics for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form, 1170 firms 
N = 6832 b 
(Number of underfunded firms = 6,226; Number of fully or overfunded firms = 606)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bMVE  Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 NPE  Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EbPC  Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common shares  
outstanding 
 Bonds  Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Equity   Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 RealEstate Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding 
 OtherAssets Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common shares  
outstanding 
 Funded  Percentage Funded using Pension Assets less Pension Benefit Obligation, (PA – PBO) 
 SVC  Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 INT  Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EXPRET Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Div  Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding 
 Size  Natural logarithm of total assets 
 N  Number of firm years 
  
Variable Mean Std. dev. Variable Mean Std. 
dev. 
MVE 8586.43 26375.74 OtherAssets 40.90 155.72 
NPE 17.07 44.25 Funded 77.91 19.78 
EbPC 2.97 8.24 SVC 38.62 128.18 
Bonds 387.53 773.04 INT 97.89 362.57 
Equity 212.64 416.42 EXPRET 1620.52 6594.67 
RealEstate 12.94 59.31 Div 195.55 790.49 
  Size -3.07 1.66 
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Table 15 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form  
N = 6000 c 
(Number of underfunded firms = 4,777; Number of fully or overfunded firms = 1223)   
 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5  Real Estateit + β6 Other Assetsit   
+ β7 Fundedit  + β8 Underit + β9Under_Fundedit+ β10 Under_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12  INTit  
+ β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit  + β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit 
+ β18 Fin_Bondsit + β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit   
+ β22 Fin_Underit + β23 Fin_Fundedit + β24 Fin_Under_Fundedit   + ε   (6)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, ***  Significance at .10, .05, .01.  
 
 
 
 
Variables  Model(1)  
NPE          16.506**  
EbPC          75.732***  
Bonds           -1.058  
Equity           -1.941***  
RealEstate            4.766  
OtherAssets           -0.810  
Funded          -4.263  
Under    -7881.015***  
Under_Funded     4069.536***  
Under_Bonds           1.352**  
SVC         22.204***  
INT           0.274  
EXPRET          0.221***  
size      195.518  
size_Under     -590.825***  
Div          5.138***  
FinCrisis  -3395.354***  
Fin_Bonds          0.561  
Fin_Equity          0.012  
Fin_RealEstate       -28.965***  
Fin_OtherAssets          0.420  
Fin_Under    6587.897***  
Fin_Funded          9.336***  
Fin_Under_Funded   -5926.085***  
    
Adjusted R2          0.1025  
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Table 15 (cont.)  
 
cMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 NPE   Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common  
shares outstanding 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common  
shares outstanding 
 Funded   Pension assets divided by Accumulated Benefit Obligation, PA/ABO  
 Under   1 if Funded < 1, 0 otherwise 
 Under_Funded  Interaction term for Under and Funded 
 Under_Bonds  Interaction term for Under and Bonds 
 SVC   Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 INT   Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EXPRET  Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Div   Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding 
 size   Natural logarithm of total assets 
 size_Under  Interaction term for size and Under 
 FinCrisis  If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise 
 Fin_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds  
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 Fin_RealEstate  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 Fin_OtherAssets  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or   
real estate 
 Fin_Under  Interaction between FinCrisis and Under 
 Fin_Funded  Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded 
 Fin_Under_Funded Interaction between FinCrisis and Under and Funded 
 N   Number of firm years 
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Table 16 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form  
N = 6832 d 
(Number of underfunded firms = 6,226; Number of fully or overfunded firms = 606)   
 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5  RealEstateit + β6 OtherAssetsit   
+ β7 Funded2it  + β8 Under2it + β9Under2_Funded2it+ β10 Under2_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12  INTit  
+ β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit  + β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit 
+ β18 Fin_Bondsit + β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit   
+ β22 Fin_Under2it + β23 Fin_Funded2it + β24 Fin_Under2_Funded2it + ε   (6)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, ***  Significance at .10, .05, .01.  
 
 
 
 
Variables  Model(2)  
NPE          11.473*  
EbPC          71.221***  
Bonds           -1.712**  
Equity           -1.872***  
RealEstate            4.066  
OtherAssets           -0.294  
Funded2          56.985**  
Under2    -4960.355***  
Under2_Funded2          -0.987  
Under2_Bonds           1.713**  
SVC         21.969***  
INT         -0.207  
EXPRET          0.226***  
size      692.911***  
size_Under2     -971.243***  
Div          5.125***  
FinCrisis   -4283.356***  
Fin_Bonds          0.392  
Fin_Equity          0.041  
Fin_RealEstate       -29.605***  
Fin_OtherAssets         -0.139  
Fin_Under2  12771.060**  
Fin_Funded2        65.127  
Fin_Under2_Funded2       -33.309**  
    
Adjusted R2          0.1033  
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Table 16 (cont.)  
 
dMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 NPE   Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common  
shares outstanding 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common  
shares outstanding 
 Funded2  Percentage Funded using Pension Assets less Pension Benefit Obligation, 
    100 * (1 +((PA – PBO) /PBO))  
 Under2   1 if Funded2 < 100%, 0 otherwise 
 Under2_Funded2 Interaction term for Under2 and Funded2 
 Under2_Bonds  Interaction term for Under2 and Bonds 
 SVC   Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 INT   Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EXPRET  Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Div   Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding 
 size   Natural logarithm of total assets 
 size_Under2  Interaction term for size and Under2 
 FinCrisis  If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise 
 Fin_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds  
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 Fin_RealEstate  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 Fin_OtherAssets  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or   
real estate 
 Fin_Under2  Interaction between FinCrisis and Under2 
 Fin_Funded2  Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded2 
 Fin_Under2_Funded2 Interaction between FinCrisis and Under2 and Funded2 
 N   Number of firm years 
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Table 17 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form to determine the effect of SFAS 158 N = 6000e 
N = 1878 for 2003-2005 with 1481 underfunded and 397 fully or overfunded; N = 4122 for 2006-2011 with 3296 underfunded 
and 826 fully or overfunded 
 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5  Real Estateit + β6 Other Assetsit  + β7 Fundedit  + β8 Underit + β9Under_Fundedit 
+ β10 Under_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12  INTit + β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit  + β15 size_Underit + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit+ β18 Fin_Bondsit  
+ β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit + β22 Fin_Underit + β23 Fin_Fundedit + β24 Fin_Under_Fundedit  + ε (6) 
  
 
 
Variable28 NPE EbPC Bonds Equity RealEstate OtherAssets Funded Under Under_Funded 
Pre SFAS 158 
2003-05 
13.191 37.518 -5.805*** -0.998 12.619* -1.821 -1.233 -8294.605*** 3552.76* 
Post SFAS 158 
2006-2011 
10.461 86.794*** -3.044*** -1.549*** 2.751 -1.006 151.312 -8024.644*** 3205.284 
Difference -2.7 49.3 2.8 -0.6 -9.9 0.8 152.5 270.0 -347.5 
F (1, 4883) 0.02 0.52 1.30 0.91 2.70 0.20 0.36 0.01 0.03 
Prob>F 0.88 0.47 0.25 0.34 0.10 0.66 0.55 0.91 0.87 
 
 
 
Variable Under_Bonds INT SVC EXPRET size size_Under Div FinCrisis Fin_Bonds 
Pre SFAS 158 
2003-05 
6.936*** -17.366*** 82.660*** 0.450** -436.736 -597.500 3.898***   
Post SFAS 158 
2006-2011 
2.695*** 9.183*** 20.886*** 0.095 488.823* -879.580*** 5.112*** -3092.763*** 0.231 
Difference29 -4.2 26.5 -61.8 -0.4 925.6 -282.1 1.2   
F (1, 4883) 3.39 83.37 63.71 3.70 4.91 0.36 5.71 13.06 0.04 
Prob>F 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.55 0.02 0.00 0.83 
 
                                                 
28 *, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
29 For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_Other Assets, Fin_Under, Fin_Funded, Fin_Under_Funded, I am testing 
if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
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Table 17 (Cont.) 
 
Variable Fin_Equity Fin_RealEstate Fin_Other Assets Fin_Under Fin_Funded Fin_Under_Funded 
Post SFAS 158 
2006-2011 
0.136 -30.062*** 0.876 5542.59*** -140.930 -5326.042*** 
Difference30       
F (1, 4883) 0.05 17.64 0.17 9.77 0.33 6.79 
Prob>F 0.82 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.57 0.01 
 
H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β24 = 0   H0: NPE1 = NPE2 & EbPC2 = EbPC1…..& Div2 = Div1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_Under_Funded = 031 
F(41, 4883) = 17.79  F(24, 4883) = 9.57 
Prob>F = 0.000   Prob>F = 0.000 
 
eMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 NPE   Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common shares outstanding 
 Funded   Pension assets divided by accumulated benefit obligation: PA/ABO  
 Under   1 if Funded < 1; 0 otherwise 
 Under_Funded  Interaction term for Under and Funded 
 Under_Bonds  Interaction term for Under and Bonds 
 SVC   Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 INT   Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EXPRET  Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Div   Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding 
 size   Natural logarithm of total assets 
 size_Under  Interaction term for size and Under 
                                                 
30 For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_OtherAssets, Fin_Under, Fin_Funded, Fin_Under_Funded I am testing 
if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
31 NPE1 is the coefficient for NPE in pre-SFAS 158 period, NPE2 is the coefficient for NPE in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and FinCrisis is the 
coefficient for FinCrisis in the post –SFAS 158 period, etc. 
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 Table 17 (Cont.) 
  
 FinCrisis  If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise 
 Fin_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds  
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 Fin_RealEstate  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 Fin_OtherAssets  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or  real estate 
 Fin_Under  Interaction between FinCrisis and Under 
 Fin_Funded  Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded 
 Fin_Under_Funded Interaction between FinCrisis and Under and Funded 
 N   Number of firm years 
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Table 18 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form  to determine the effect of SFAS 158 N = 6832 f 
N = 2156 for 2003-2005 with 1995 underfunded and 161 fully or overfunded; N = 4676 for 2006-2011 with 4231 underfunded and 
445 fully or overfunded 
 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5  RealEstateit + β6 OtherAssetsit  + β7 Funded2it  + β8 Under2it + β9Under2_Funded2it 
+ β10 Under2_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12  INTit + β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit  + β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit+ β18 Fin_Bondsit  
+ β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit + β22 Fin_Under2it + β23 Fin_Funded2it + β24 Fin_Under2_Funded2it  + ε        (6) 
   
 
 
Variable32 NPE EbPC Bonds Equity RealEstate OtherAssets Funded2 Under2 Under2_Funded2 
Pre SFAS 158 
2003-05 
12.494 31.900 -8.042** -1.217* -1.217* -0.433 63.69** -6029.52** -2.860 
Post SFAS 158 
2006-2011 
4.491 89.406*** -3.799*** -1.682*** 3.688 -0.802 -19.103 -5781.165*** -19.103 
Difference          
F (1, 5621) 0.25 0.97 1.30 0.62 2.37 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.25 
Prob>F 0.62 0.33 0.25 0.43 0.12 0.82 0.97 0.092 0.62 
 
 
Variable Under2_Bonds INT SVC EXPRET size size_Under2 Div FinCrisis Fin_Bonds 
Pre SFAS 158 
2003-05 
7.880*** -18.119*** 78.726*** 0.464*** 522.871 -1322.519** 4.351***   
Post SFAS 158 
2006-2011 
3.475*** 7.463*** 23.239*** 0.088 809.186*** -1041.611*** 5.108*** -4363.264*** 0.020 
Difference33          
F (1, 5621) 1.70 69.49 81.44 4.72 0.25 0.21 2.66 11.23 0.00 
Prob>F 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.62 0.64 0.10 0.000 0.98 
                                                 
32 *, **, *** Significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 
33 For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_Other Assets, Fin_Under, Fin_Funded, Fin_Under_Funded I am testing if 
these coefficients are equal to zero. 
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Table 18 (Cont.) 
 
Variable Fin_Equity Fin_RealEstate Fin_Other Assets Fin_Under2 Fin_Funded2 Fin_Under2_Funded2 
Post SFAS 158 
2006-2011 
0.114 -30.131*** 0.488 11181.7* 56.789 -92.922* 
Difference34       
F (1, 5621) 0.04 20.64 0.06 3.39 1.27 3.06 
Prob>F 0.84 0.00 0.80 0.07 0.26 0.08 
 
H0: β0 = β1 = ……= β24 = 0   H0: NPE1 = NPE2 & EbPC2 = EbPC1…..& Div2 = Div1& Fin2Crisis= 0 &….Fin2_Under_Funded = 035 
F(41, 5621) = 20.20  F(24, 5621) = 10.20 
Prob>F = 0.000   Prob>F = 0.000 
 
fMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 NPE   Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common shares outstanding 
 Funded2  Percentage Funded using Pension Assets less Pension Benefit Obligation, 100 * (1 +((PA – PBO) /PBO))  
 Under2   1 if Funded2< 100%, 0 otherwise 
 Under2_Funded2 Interaction term for Under2 and Funded2 
 Under2_Bonds  Interaction term for Under2 and Bonds 
 SVC   Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 INT   Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EXPRET  Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding  
                                                 
34 For the variables FinCrisis, Fin_Bonds, Fin_Equity, Fin_RealEstate, and Fin_OtherAssets, Fin_Under2, Fin_Funded2, Fin_Under2_Funded2 I am testing 
if these coefficients are equal to zero. 
35 NPE1 is the coefficient for NPE in pre-SFAS 158 period, NPE2 is the coefficient for NPE in post-SFAS 158 period, etc. and FinCrisis is the coefficient 
for FinCrisis in the post –SFAS 158 period, etc. 
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 Table 18 (Cont.) 
  
 Div   Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding 
 size   Natural logarithm of total assets 
 size_Under2  Interaction term for size and Under2 
 FinCrisis  If year = 2008-09, 1; 0 otherwise 
 Fin_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds  
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 Fin_RealEstate  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 Fin_OtherAssets  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or  real estate 
 Fin_Under2  Interaction between FinCrisis and Under2 
 Fin_Funded2  Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded2 
 Fin_Under2_Funded2 Interaction between FinCrisis and Under2 and Funded2 
 N   Number of firm years 
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Table 19 Estimation of market value for 2003-2011, variables in per-share form  
N = 6000 g 
(Number of underfunded firms = 4,777; Number of fully or overfunded firms = 1223)  
 
 
MVEit = β0 + β1 NPEit + β2 EbPCit + β3 Bondsi+ β4 Equityit + β5  Real Estateit + β6 Other Assetsit   
+ β7 Fundedit  + β8 Underit + β9Under_Fundedit+ β10 Under_Bondsit + β11 SVCit + β12  INTit  
+ β13 EXPRETit + β14 sizeit  + β15 size_Under2it + β16 Divit + β17 FinCrisisit 
+ β18 Fin_Bondsit + β19 Fin_Equityit + β20 Fin_RealEstateit + β21 Fin_OtherAssetsit   
+ β22 Fin_Underit + β23 Fin_Fundedit + β24 Fin_Under_Fundedit   + ε   (6)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*, **, ***  Significance at .10, .05, .01.  
 
 
 
 
Variables Model(2) Model(3) Model(4) 
NPE        16.506**      14.694*      15.228* 
EbPC         75.732***      81.521***      81.527*** 
Bonds          -1.058       -0.668       -1.442 
Equity          -1.941***       -1.740***       -1.901*** 
RealEstate           4.766        4.448        4.416 
OtherAssets          -0.810       -0.472       -0.847 
Funded         -4.263       -3.778       -4.157 
Under   -7881.015*** -6223.169*** -6325.666*** 
Under_Funded    4069.536***  2131.482  2064.886 
Under_Bonds          1.352**        0.809        1.717** 
SVC        22.204***      22.965***      22.229*** 
INT          0.274      -0.629        0.080 
EXPRET         0.221***       0.219***        0.226*** 
size     195.518   246.277    235.398 
size_Under    -590.825***  -633.149***   -627.859*** 
Div         5.138***       5.110***        5.105*** 
FinCrisis -3395.354***  -330.223   -424.140 
Fin_Bonds         0.561       0.128        0.257 
Fin_Equity         0.012       0.218        0.224 
Fin_RealEstate      -28.965***      -7.190     -32.059*** 
Fin_OtherAssets         0.420      -0.188        0.297 
Fin_Under   6587.897***  1422.974**  1435.358** 
Fin_Funded         9.336***        5.040        5.455 
Fin_Under_Funded  -5926.085*** -3362.910*** -2956.053*** 
    
Adjusted R2         0.1025        0.0957        0.998 
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Table 19 (cont.)  
 
gMVE   Fiscal year-end market value of common equity 
 NPE   Owner’s equity plus net pension liabilities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EbPC   Earnings before extraordinary items before pension costs scaled by common  
shares outstanding 
 Bonds   Pension assets invested in bonds scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Equity    Pension assets invested in equities scaled by common shares outstanding 
 RealEstate  Pension assets invested in real estate scaled by common shares outstanding 
 OtherAssets  Pension assets not invested in equities, bonds, or real estate scaled by common  
shares outstanding 
 Funded   Pension assets divided by Accumulated Benefit Obligation, PA/AB0  
 Under   1 if Funded < 1, 0 otherwise 
 Under_Funded  Interaction term for Under and Funded 
 Under_Bonds  Interaction term for Under and Bonds 
 SVC   Pension service costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 INT   Pension interest costs scaled by common shares outstanding 
 EXPRET  Expected Return on plan Assets scaled by common shares outstanding  
 Div   Dividends scaled by common shares outstanding 
 size   Natural logarithm of total assets 
 size_Under  Interaction term for size and Under 
 Fin_Bonds  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in bonds  
 Fin_Equity  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in equities 
 Fin_RealEstate  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets invested in real estate 
 Fin_OtherAssets  Interaction between FinCrisis and plan assets not invested in equities, bonds, or   
real estate 
 Fin_Under  Interaction between FinCrisis and Under 
 Fin_Funded  Interaction between FinCrisis and Funded 
 Fin_Under_Funded Interaction between FinCrisis and Under and Funded 
 N   Number of firm years 
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Appendix A: Estimation of DEFRET and ATRANS 
TAMOR, the net deferral and amortization pension cost component, is required under 
SFAS 87. What is not required is the four components of TAMOR: ATRANS 
(amortization of the transition asset at the date of adoptions of SFAS 87); DEFRET (the 
net gain or loss during the period which is deferred for later recognition); the 
amortization of prior service cost; and the amortization of the gain or loss from earlier 
periods. Barth et al. (1992) that ATRANS and DEFRET are the primary components of 
TAMOR with the other two components assumed to be on average zero. They are often 
not disclosed but can be calculated from information that is required in the financial 
statements using a method outlined in Barth et al. (1992). 
First, one starts by calculating EXPRET, the expected rate of return. It is the product 
of the assumed long-term rate of return (rate) and the beginning- of-year plan assets 
(PALAG). l  is the remaining service life of the employees covered by the pension plan 
and TR_ASSET is the transition asset at the time of adoption. The relations are as 
follows: 
EXPRET= rate * PALAG 
DEFRET = EXPRET – RPLNA 
ATRANS = 1/ l  * TR_ASSET 
TAMOR = DEFRET + ATRANS + ε 
TAMOR + RPLNA = (rate * PALAG) + (1/ l  * TR_ASSET)  
Based on the relations above, the following cross-sectional regression is used to 
estimate DEFRET and ATRANS: 
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TAMOR + RPLNA = β0 + β1 PALAG + β2 TR_ASSET + ε 
(In Barth et al. (1996), other variables were included to control for early and non-early 
adopters. Believing these effects have diminished sufficiently over time, I omit them).If 
ATRANS or DEFRET are given then the estimated values are set equal to the reported 
value. 
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